Afghanistan: India on the Right Course

On an early September 2002 morning, as breakfast was being served in the cavernously high-ceilinged dining hall of Hotel Inter-continental in the devastated capital city of Kabul, a Pakistani turned to the Afghan bearer, “Where did you live during the mujahideen war?” “In Pakistan, sir,” the man replied. His questioner turned triumphantly towards his companion, a Westerner, and remarked, “Ha! Did you hear him? This is the story you will hear all over Afghanistan. Pakistan opened its doors to millions of refugees from Afghanistan and sheltered them for year after year. No Afghan will ever forget this.”

By this time, the bearer was serving my breakfast. In a low voice, he said, “They will also never forget that it was Pakistan which created and led the Taliban into their country and protected and helped them to oppress us all the time.”

It is difficult to believe today, twelve years after Afghanistan was liberated from the clutches of the Taliban, that from that time onwards it was the USA which was the most popular country in the war-ravaged country. It was a common sight those days to see American soldiers being mobbed by over-enthusiastic Afghans on the streets of Kabul .

The next most popular country in Afghan eyes was India. While the popular perception about the United States has since reached the lowest depths imaginable, India and Indians continue to be as popular as ever. Pakistan is not hated as intensely and widely as before but the common Afghan remains quite strongly distrustful of its actions and intentions. At the level of government, the trust deficit between the two capitals is always on display.

This brings us to the necessity of under-standing the India-Afghanistan relationship. To its credit, the Indian Government never betrayed an anxiety to make up fast for the lost opportunities in Afghanistan. India lost trust in Afghanistan with the Soviet invasion in 1979 when it failed to condemn the USSR outright and continued to be in that unenviable position throughout the mujahideen years and the Taliban rule. During the latter period, it also enjoyed the rare distinction of being bracketed along with the USA and Israel as one of the three “most hated” countries.

India could only step again into Afghanistan after the Taliban fled under the merciless onslaught of the US-led invasion in November 2001 and immediately went into playing the role of bringing succour to the horribly mutilated population. Indian pharmaceutical companies became highly visible as did Indian physicians, nurses and paramedical and hospital support staff. India also began to play a major role in reviving the public transport system and the school and university education system. On its own steam, India’s famous soft power, Bollywood, and its melodious songs regained their lost positions overnight in Afghan homes and bazaars.

As 2014 draws nearer when the eventual withdrawal of US and other foreign forces are scheduled to occur, Afghanistan’s neighbours are already in the thick of sorting out each other’s strategic thinking on their future relationships with the country. As part of this exercise, the USA, Russia, China, the UK, India, Pakistan and Iran as well as the Central Asian Republics (CARs) of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, have been holding mostly trilateral dialogues. Their common aim is to ensure that the relative stability and democratic functioning of the Afghan state and its uninterrupted economic development achieved in the last twelve years continues undisturbed.

While all the states involved in the process are in agreement with this overall objective and are presently working out the prospects of forging suitable mechanisms for mutual and regional cooperation and coordination, the largely unknown and indeterminate factor is the policy that the Afghan Taliban pursues in the post-2014 scenario.

So far, it is only the USA, UK and Pakistan which have held discussions with the Taliban. All the three countries have also been instru-mental in persuading the Hamid Karzai Government to hold discussions with the renegade Taliban though the Afghan Govern-ment has been eloquent enough to express its strong disinclination to trust the rebels.

As far as the rest of the neighbourhood is concerned, the sole official Taliban statement issued on January 3, 2013 appears to be intended more for public consumption than as an honest response. It said that the ongoing transfer of security operations from US troops to the Afghan forces was merely a retreat “similar to the withdrawal from South Vietnam prior to the Communist victory there in 1975.”

“They want to flee from Afghanistan just as they turned tail and ran from Vietnam,” the rebel group said. “When America faced utter destruction in Vietnam, they came up with the formula ‘declare victory and run’ and want to utilise the formula of ‘transfer security and run’ here in Afghanistan.” American troops actually withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973 leaving it to face the onslaught of the unstoppable North Vietnamese forces. The Vietcong finally marched into Saigon in 1975.

The bravado of the Taliban is self-evident. It is far from the position that North Vietnam enjoyed when the United States found it impossible to hold on to South Vietnam any longer. Despite the heavy price that US and NATO forces have already paid in Afghanistan, the very fact that a democratic state (howsoever imperfect) with a functioning parliament has been in existence for years and that a normal society, with all its manifestations in socio-economic sectors, has been successfully revived is proof enough that the Taliban would not be in a position similar to the Vietcong.

An equally vital contributor to the different reality in Afghanistan is the enormous stakes that democratic neighbouring states and China, the second most powerful country in the world, have already established in the country. The mineral wealth of Afghanistan is enormous, and a number of powerful countries are either already occupied with extracting or are in the process of doing so. While China is the foremost among these countries, India is also emerging as a major investor.

And this brings us to the formulation that India’s policy on Afghanistan is on the right course. By being a worthwhile partner in the reconstruction and development of the country, New Delhi is able to establish its bona fides as a player in the post-2014 scenario.

India has determined that the process of peace and reconciliation (by bringing in those members of the Taliban who abjure violence, give up arms and swear allegiance to the state of Afghanistan and its Constitution) must be Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven. To quote External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, “You can’t give readymade solutions to Afghanistan and tell it to apply them. Solutions have to come from within Afghanistan.” (The Hindu, April 29, 2013)

This is the position with which both Russia and China agree. What has come as a pleasant surprise is Pakistan’s assertion that it also shares this approach. The former Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, told A.G. Noorani, “The Government of Pakistan’s policy and the nation of Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan is that a stable, peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan is in the vital national interest of Pakistan...The road to a stable, peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan only passes through Kabul, what we call an Afghan-owned, Afghan-driven route to prosperity. I think one thing which we, the international community, should have learnt in the last 30 years is that no slolution can be imposed upon a nation or a people, and Afghaistan is the best crying example of that.” (Frontline, April 19, 2013)

She buttressed her point by stating in the same interview she could commit that the Government of Pakistan had no interest or had no desire and had no policy to infiltrate anything anywhere.

Considering the historical role that Pakistan has played in Afghanistan since the advent of communist governments in that country in the late-1970s and till today, this assertion of Hina Khar can only invoke cynicism and incredulity in India and elsewhere in the neighbourhood. To her credit, Ms Khar appears to be fully cognisant of this negative response, and this is why she purposely added the words “the nation of Pakistan’s policy”. She obviously wished to emphasise the inclusion of the armed forces, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and the foreign office, in her narrative.

However, apart from the obvious logic of sustaining the long-cultivated policy of nurturing and maintaining a major influence on Afghanistan, Pakistan has a very vital ally in the Afghan Taliban (in contrast to the Pakistani Taliban) which remains an enigma and is likely to remain so in the coming days. Therefore, as 2014 draws near and the neighbours prepare themselves to be ready for the post-Western forces withdrawal, the future remains substan-tially indeterminate.

Under the circumstances, it is but natural for India to continue to play a significant beneficial role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. While this correctly remains the cornerstone of this country’s Afghanistan policy, statecraft also requires it to protect and advance its national interests in that country. Foremost of these interests is preservation of security in a situation which is not only beyond India’s control but also to a large extent under the immediate gaze of a vitally interested Pakistan.

Irrespective of Ms Khar’s statement, Pakistan is officially known to have reiterated at every trilateral dialogue it has held in 2013 with various international players that India must not be allowed to play any role in the future evolution of Afghanistan. While India has not directly responded to this open display of rivalry, the Afghan Government has stated categorically that India-Afghanistan relations will continue to be as warm and friendly as ever. As the Afghan ambassador in New Delhi Shaida Abdali told Jyoti Malhotra (The Hindu, April 12, 2013), “Afghanistan will protect its partnership with India at any cost.”

Apratim Mukarji is an analyst of South and Central Asian affairs.