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Mainstream, VOL L No 12, March 10, 2012

Illusion versus Reality

Tuesday 13 March 2012, by Nikhil Chakravartty

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From N.C.’s Writings

[(Forty years ago the following editorial appeared in Mainstream (March 4, 1972) dissecting the Shanghai Communique concluded at the and of US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China. This has a lasting value and is being reproduced for the benefit of our readers.)]

After his pilgrimage to Peking, which he pompously claims to have changed the world, Mr Nixon has landed himself in a hornet’s nest in which long-standing allies and stooges are in a state of fear intermixed with indignation, once again underlying the fact that the US global policy has been caught in such a mess that even when it tries to atone for past mistakes, it cannot but get sunk deeper into the quagmire of worse crisis.

If anything, the Nixon overture to Peking has once again brought out the inexorable reality that unless Washington is prepared to make a break with its politics of the Cold War—based on its concept of balance of power, pursued during the last two decades-and-a-half since the Second World War—it cannot escape the tentacles of a crisis. Gimmicks cannot make up for statesmanship: this is the key to the understanding of the impact of the Nixon-Chou Communiqué on the USA’s friends and adversaries alike.

The anomaly in the US global strategy under Nixon is that it tries to achieve the impossible; that is, continuing with the policy-framework of the Cold War while, at the same time, seeking desperately to play to the popular gallery which has seen through the bankruptcy of that very policy of the Cold War. The China trip has the elements of both: on the one hand, it tries to establish rapport with Peking when it is suffering from a protracted bout of anti-Soviet frenzy; and on the other, it tries to placate the overwhelming mass urge of the American people for a genuine understanding with People’s China. In other words, Nixon does not have the vision and statesmanship of a Roosevelt to boldly bring down the wall of hate against communism in power, but he has understood that the old-style McCarthy-Goldwater crusade against communism would lose him the coming presidential contest hands down.

It is this which accounts for the persistence of contradictions on every issue taken up in the Shanghai Communiqué. Nixon writes off Chiang Kai-shek, but still keeps up the make-believe of support for Taiwan.

He agrees to the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence evolved at Bandung, and at the same time continues with the predatory aggression in Vietnam. The Communiqué piously declares that the “United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression”. At the same time the barbarous US bombing continues over Vietnam.
While Nixon pledges support for the South Korean efforts at “relaxation of tension and increase of communications in the Korean Peninsula”, he sticks to the so-called UN Commission (the fig-leaf for US armed presence) which, in reality, is the main source of tension between the two Koreas. Viewed from another angle, the contra-diction in the US policy in the region becomes patent: while Nixon “affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan” it makes no such promise either with respect of Korea or Vietnam.
The absurdity of the US position comes out sharply with regard to China as well. While it will “stay in contact through various channels including the sending of a senior US represen-tative from time to time”, Nixon did not dare to cut the Gordian’s knot and transfer diplomatic representation for China from Taiwan to Peking. While he is forced to admit that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”, he persists in the fiction of according diplomatic recognition to Taiwan to represent the whole of China.

The basic contradiction in the US policy lies in
the fact that it has not yet moved out of its exploded thesis of “containment of communism”; in Washington’s time-honoured assessment, it is Moscow that poses the real threat of communism for its mission of imposing Pax Americana over the world. And in this unswerving drive to contain Moscow, the US Administration is bent on trying to exploit the current anti-Soviet posture of Peking. It is not without significance that Nixon in his farewell banquet at Shanghai said that “the Chinese and American people hold the future of the world in their hands”. Equally significant, in this context, is the absence in the Communiqué of even any platitude about the need for disarma-ment. He earlier had made the ominous hint that “the results of his mission would not in fact be evident for many years”. In other words, what Nixon has tried to achieve in his China trip is to apply a revised version of the same Cold-War strategy which was initiated by Churchill at Fulton twentyfour years ago and later on perfected under Truman and Dulles.

This is not surprising when one looks at the sprawling establishment over which President Nixon presides. From the Pentagon to the CIA, from the State Department to the White House, no apparatus of the US Administration can delink itself from the vast military-industrial complex about which Eisenhower in his last days as the President had warned. The entire complex is geared to the objectives of the Cold War; only the focus is now slightly changed. Instead of treating the world communist movement as one monolithic Colossus, Washington today tries to look upon Peking with benevolence, hoping to use it as a checkmate against Moscow; and if the worst comes to the worst, try to use Mao’s millions as cannon fodder in any show-down with the Soviet Union.

It is no accident that the ideologue of the Nixon era in Washington is Dr Henry Kissinger. An admirer of Spengler as well as Metternich, Kissinger in a thesis wrote in his undergraduate days: “All truly great achievements in history resulted from the actualisation of principles, not from the clever evaluation of political conditions.” In terms of today this should mean that the idée fixe of the Cold War has to be adhered to, and political strategy need not emerge from the assessment of the changed situation.

In his doctorate dissertation in the early fifties Kissinger had underlined that “stability based on an equilibrium of forces” ensured peace and security in Europe before the First World War. It is the working of the same theory of equilibrium of forces that led him to Peking last year. With the military blocs turning out to be practically useless in blocking the advance of Moscow—whether in Europe or Asia—and its military might miserably exposed by tiny Vietnam, Washington under Kissinger has had to go in for a new power equilibrium; and so, in desperation, he took Nixon all the way to China, hoping to cash in on the current animosity between Moscow and Peking. And for that they were prepared to pay the price: the jettisoning of the useless Chiang Kai-shek is not so much the manifestation of a realistic recognition of a patently wrong and unjust policy so long pursued against China but has been used as a bargaining counter with Peking. It was not done with the idea of starting on a clean slate with China that would have meant the formal liqui-dation of the Taiwan regime, an act which would have scared other stooges to go in for mass desertion from Washington’s far-flung empire. The working of the Balance-of-Power strategy needs a lot of balancing within the empire itself.
In essence, what was sought to be achieved in Peking is a sort of co-sponsored Sino-US Monroe Doctrine for Asia; and this has been put in so many words in the Shanghai Communique itself: “Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to the effort by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” Nobody has any illusion that this is meant for Moscow, and at the same time is a recognition of the concern felt by both Washington and Peking at the extension of the Soviet Union’s understanding with Asian powers along the entire arc that passes through Kabul, New Delhi, Dacca, and right up to Hanoi—an arc that has turned out to be strategically more significant than Moscow’s breakthrough in West Asia. At the same time, unlike the military-bloc partners of the US, the constellation of powers along this arc are not only more viable but have joined in strength by their closer relationship with Moscow. Hence, there is less chance of any Sino-US Monroe Doctrine being able to make a dent on this arc.

A few years ago, the US policy-makers were toying with the idea of propping up Japan and, if possible, India as their main conduits in South and East Asia. These two powers were supposed to supplement what the military bloc partners could not achieve, namely, spreading the US tentacles through massive aid and political infiltration. This was the period of the Asoka Mehta-Subramaniam-L.K. Jha raj in this country; the devaluation of the rupee was forced upon India and there was talk galore about the impending avalanche of an Asian Marshall Plan. But the plan fell through because Washington realised that India cannot be depended upon to play the role of a client state, while Japanese capital posed a formidable challenge to the US tycoons even in the home market

Meanwhile, the overtures towards China matured. Personally, Nixon was in search of a stunt in the year of the presidential election, while his Adviser Extraordinary, Kissinger, was in search of a partner in the balance-of-power game. Peking provided the answer for both.

On the part of Peking, it has been able to force Washington to concede the point on Taiwan, which the Chinese Government in its first official contact with the US Government on the subject in the mid-fifties, had made clear: namely, that the USA must accept the two basic principles—first that all US-China disputes including Taiwan, could and should be settled through peaceful negotiations: and, secondly, in the words of Chou En-lai, “the United States must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are matters of subsequent discussion.” In his interview to Edgar Snow in 1960, Chou En-lai revealed that the first of these two principles was put forward at the end of 1955, and the second was presented at Warsaw in the autumn of 1958. After years of arrogant rejection, Washington has had to climb down and concede exactly what Peeking had all along maintained.

It would however be wrong to think that Peking has won its point without a price. Despite its trumpet blast in the Communiqué that “China will never be a superpower and it opposes hege-mony and power politics of any kind”, few will be deceived into believing that the Nixon-Chou talks are anything but power-politics in action. The superpower status was implied in the cons-picuous absence of any reference to nuclear disarmament in the Shanghai Communiqué despite China’s frequent declaration in the past that it stood for a world disarmament conference for banning nuclear weapons; even the cliché that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, is missing in the Communiqué.

Peking’s difficulty has been to reconcile any rapport with the USA with its professed support for the Vietnamese struggle. With all the support extended to the Seven-Point Proposal of the PRG of South Vietnam, there is no condemnation of the saturation bombing by the US. The call for the withdrawal of foreign troops does not necessarily preclude such bombing raids as the US itself is going in for electronic bombing without having to retain GIs in Vietnam in the election year.

The Mao dictum is thickly spread in words in the Communiqué:

“Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution”—beautiful words indeed, though they sound a little odd in a horse-trading Communiqué with the head of the biggest imperialist power today.

What is worth noting is that the Peking leaders had branded Khrushchov and Kosygin for going no further than they themselves have gone. They made a fuss about Khrushchov’s Camp David talk with Johnson, but they in the same breath took Nixon round the Great Wall and the Hangchow Lake. Not that such protocol hospitality is ana-thema to the cause of socialism, but there could be no two standards—one for Moscow and another for Peking. For doing far less in culti-vating the USA on a state-to-state basis, Peking had condemned the Soviet leaders with the charge of social revisionism.

After having put on the mantle of pure revolutionaries when it came to attacking Moscow, the Chinese leaders are no doubt hard put today before the anti-imperialist world to hide the contradictions in their own postures, professions and actions.

Nehru once said in the early days of Peking’s nibbling at the Indian frontier: “From fairly early in history, they have had a sensation of greatness. They called themselves the Middle Kingdom, and it seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupied a lower grade.” (November 25, 1959) Inside the communist world, it was this trait which had brought Peking into conflict with a large number of Socialist countries, and not with Moscow alone. Along with other causes of their dispute with a number of Socialist countries, this complex of being a great power has no doubt conditioned the Peking perspective; Mao has often reminded the world that China has a population of seven hundred million.

At the same time, it would perhaps be incorrect to assume that the Sino-American entente has become a fact of history, with the prospect of a combined anti-Soviet crusade. How the Chinese mind calculates on this point is revealed by what Chou En-lai said in an interview to K.S. Karol in March 1965:”... if the Americans are not content with threatening gestures and really want to provoke a wider conflict, then the Chinese and the Russian people will close ranks. That is the truth. Remember that and you will see that history will bear it out.” In other words, Chou En-lai, while conceding that the basic contra-diction in the world of today is between US imperialism and the socialist world, tries to play upon the minor internal contradictions that plague both the socialist and imperialist camps.

This way, Chou En-lai hopes to take advantage of American difficulties to squeeze concessions out of Nixon and Kissinger. And Taiwan is not the only concession to be secured. More important from a long range point of view is the emphasis in the Communiqué on the development of bilateral trade and the forging of “economic relations”. Having cut herself adrift from the mainstream of the socialist world, it is but inevitable for China to seek other sources from which to get capital goods and industrial raw materials including technology, for making the country an industrially developed country. And for getting all that, the bait of anti-Sovietism will be held before the policy-planners at Washington. This Chinese strategy is no more elevating than horse-trading in the market of power-politics, no matter how this is clothed in inspiring platitudes about supporting “the struggle of all oppressed peoples, nations for freedom and liberation”, etcetera.

In this game of each trying to get the maximum out of the other, neither ethics nor international morality is involved. What may be important to watch is: who gains at whose expense in the long run? The common digit at the moment is anti-Sovietism, though both the powers are careful not to spell it out. Nixon hopes to use his rapport with Peking as a lever against Moscow, just as Peking hopes to use its anti-Soviet posture as a lever to extract concession from Washington. At some point, the game has to end, and the reality will intrude in all its grimness. The power game has not always worked out as its players have wanted. Had it been so, then Hitler would never had to break with the Anglo-US bloc and should have headed the Holy Alliance of all the imperia-list powers against the Land of Communism. Nixon’s dreams—or rather Kissinger’s calcula-tions—are more likely to founder on the rock of history.

Surprise has been expressed in many quarters at the discriminatorily unfriendly treatment meted out to India in the Nixon-Chou Communiqué. But any objective appraisal of the strategy pursued by China and the US makes it obvious that they have to make a pointed reference to the plight of Pakistan, the ally of both and yet has had to face a traumatic dismemberment, without either of them being able to prevent it. The animosity of both Peking and Washington towards India is understandable. Nixon has already given vent to it in his Foreign Policy Report to the US Congress on the eve of his China trip. The real point of anger against India is that it has not only come to a treaty-level understanding with Moscow, but armed with it, has been able to liberate Bangladesh and put Pakistan on the dock. The demand for the withdrawal of troops along the international boundary and along the Cease-Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir, is a sop for Pakistan, already in the throes of an internal crisis.

It is to be noted here that in the geo-political approach of both Peking and Washington, Pakistan is strategically very important, being situated along the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. Its crack-up will spell the doom for the new strategy that the Peking talks envisage. On the other hand, India has always proved to be an obstacle for the waging of the Cold War in Asia, as she has not only always valued her independence but has strengthened it in course of years, while many of the military-bloc satellites of Washington have gone down or broken away from its domination.

There is however a difference in approach between the USA and China on the question, as revealed in the Communiqué: while Peking demands the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the US side keeps silent over it and instead talks of support to “the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace”. The reason behind this is that the US still hopes to have a foot-hold in this region; although it finds it difficult to get India to toe the Washington line, Bangladesh has not yet been written off so far as the US is concerned. It is to be noted that in his Foreign Policy Report, Nixon tries to take this differentiated approach: while all the fire was concentrated on India, Bangladesh was almost offered the carrot of generous dollar aid. Peking does not seem to hope to establish in the near future such a bridgehead in South Asia, particularly after the collapse of the ultra Leftist groups owing allegiance to it. Instead, it wants to stoke the fire in Kashmir and thereby make Pakistan feel that there is no let-down for her by Peking.

As a commentary on how Peking’s policy-posture has changed, it may be worth recalling here what the Chinese Ambassador in India said in course of a statement to our Foreign Secretary in 1959: “China’s main attention and policy of struggle are directed to the east, to the west Pacific region to the vicious and aggressive imperialism, and not to India or any other country in the South-east Asia and South Asia …. We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe.”

Today the wheel seems to have come full circle. Since there cannot be “two centres of attention”, Peking seems to have chosen India as its target. But there is no need for us to overreact. This country has borne the brunt of both Peking and Washington, and is prepared to meet the threat if that is what has been hatched with all the cynicism of big-power politics during Nixon’s week in China which he claims to have shaken the world.

One only wonders which world he is living in. Illusions are often knocked out by reality.

(Mainstream, March 4, 1972)

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