The Indian Constitution is unique as it grants Cultural and Educational Rights by way of Articles 29 and 30 as fundamental rights. Article 30 in particular, guarantees to religion and language based minorities, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. This was in keeping with many schools and colleges in colonial India which served as traditional institutions of learning, at times combining subjects of both, a denominational and secular nature. Article 30 ensured continuity and also served to enable these institutions as preservers of culture. Over the years, the Supreme Court and High Courts have adjudicated on the scope of these rights and have addressed issues that have come before it regarding administration and management. Besides the courts, the National Commission for Minorities, and in particular, the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions in India has played a significant role in the State-Minority interface. This serves as a context to examine and understand recent state legislations on Article 30.
To begin with, the Uttarakhand Cabinet in October 2025 notified the Minority Education Act whereby all minority institutions from Class I-XII were required to seek affiliation from the Board of School Education in Ramnagar. From 1st July this year, the Madarsa Board in the State will be abolished and Madarsas will also fall under the ambit the Uttarakhand State Authority for Minority Education. Moreover, the Minority Education Act law also grants minority status to educational institutions set up by communities’ i.e. Sikh, Jain, Buddhist, Christian and Parsi communities; unlike before when only the Muslim community was recognised as a minority. Also, in two separate though not unrelated instances, a PIL was filed by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay before the Supreme Court of India, seeking comprehensive directions to the Union and State governments to regulate all institutions imparting education or religious instruction to children below 14 years of age. The petitioner sought a declaration that Article 30 does not grant any special or additional rights to minorities and was only a reiteration of the general right to establish educational institutions. In the second instance, a Rajya Sabha MP drew an oft repeated rhetoric of discrimination, and sought a uniform legal framework governing all religious educational institutes in India. He argued that under Article 30 minority institutions enjoyed exemptions from legislations like RTE, while institutions managed by the Hindu community were subjected to ‘administrative and financial burdens’ as ordinary ones.
It is important to understand the intention of the Indian Constitution and the positions emerging from the paragraph above. Article 30 is not an absolute right given to minorities. They are more in the nature of safeguards and a non-discriminatory clause. The Constitution and the Courts have kept in check the exercise of this right under Article 30, in keeping with the secular nature of the Indian State. Likewise, the Courts have sounded the State and the administration which may in the name of rules and regulation transgress the autonomy inherent in Article 30. This is demonstrated in judgements passed by the Supreme Court which has established that there is no fundamental right to affiliation guaranteed by Article 30. In the St Stephen’s v. University of Delhi, Managing Board of the Milli Talimi Mission, Ranchi v. State of Bihar and St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, the Court held that affiliation did not dilute the minority character of the College; that reasonable standards could be set to consider an educational institution for affiliation but these could not be arbitrary so as to destroy the very existence of the institution. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, the Court maintained that attempts by Guru Nanak University to develop Punjabi language, literature and culture could not be made a condition for affiliation, in this case institutions managed by Arya Samaj, which were recognised as a religious within the meaning of Article 30. Again, in Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Others v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court warned that regulative measures should not ‘whittle down’ provisions under Article 30 and these measures had to pass the ‘dual test of reasonableness’. In St John’s Teacher’s Training Institute (for Women), Madurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court ruled that institutes operating on the basis of temporary recognition would have to comply with recognition rules to enable them to earn recognition.
Given the instances illustrated above, it is clear that the Indian Constitution and the Courts have put in place mechanisms for the legitimate realisation of provisions under Article 30. The National Commission for Minorities recognises six religious communities i.e. Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist and Parsis as minorities. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NMCEI) looks into cases regarding implementation, regulation and misuse of Article 30 and possesses quasi judicial powers. The NCMEI issues minority status certificates to eligible educational institutions. However, what is most significant here is that the Indian State through these Commissions has sought to safeguard minority communities and has sought to shield minority communities from discrimination. The purpose is clear – upholding and safeguarding. The Supreme Court has kept a check on both, the State and the MEIs, in order to strike the balance between general and particular rights/safeguards.
This should put to rest, any apprehension regarding the nature, import and intention regarding the right under Article 30. The sense of possible reverse discrimination and scant attempts to dilute Constitutional provisions by select State actors must be reconsidered and revisited so that politics in India remains in consonance with core Constitutional values.
(Author: Dr Malavika Menon teaches at the Department of International Studies, Political Science and History, Christ University, Bengaluru)
Mainstream Weekly