Autonomy Undone: Symbolic Subordination and the Fragility of Tribal Self-Governance in Meghalaya

Abstract

The practice in Meghalaya whereby Chief Executive Members (CEMs) of the state’s three Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) are sworn into office by District Commissioners (DCs) of their headquarter districts points to a significant disjuncture between constitutional design and administrative practice. The Sixth Schedule envisages ADCs as autonomous institutions of self-governance, vested with legislative, executive, and judicial authority. However, the ritualized precedence accorded to state bureaucrats over elected functionaries symbolically subordinates local authority, raising questions about the substantive autonomy of these institutions.
This paper argues that such ceremonial practices are not merely procedural irregularities but are constitutive of power relations that shape the functioning of decentralised governance. Drawing on the Constituent Assembly debates, particularly the interventions of Nicholas Roy, it situates the emergence of ADCs within a broader vision of tribal self-rule that is increasingly mediated by bureaucratic authority. The analysis engages with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society, Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality and Sally Falk Moore’s notion of semi-autonomous social fields to argue that everyday administrative practices play a key role in normalising hierarchical state–society relations.
By foregrounding the politics of ritual and symbolism, the paper shows how bureaucratic dominance is reproduced through routine acts that blur the boundary between autonomy and control. It suggests that the fragility of tribal self-governance lies not only in institutional design but also in the ways in which state power is enacted and legitimised in practice.

Key Words: Tribal Self- Governance, Bureaucratic Dominance, Symbolic Subordination, Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), Meghalaya, Sixth Schedule and Oath -taking Ceremony.

1. Introduction: Ritual, Power, and the Fragility of Autonomy

Autonomy is often treated as a constitutional guarantee and a cornerstone of democratic pluralism. Yet it is neither fixed nor self-executing; rather, it is fragile, contingent, and continually negotiated through everyday practices of governance. This tension is especially visible in Meghalaya, where a seemingly minor procedural anomaly—the administration of oath-taking—offers insight into the limits of decentralised self-rule. In a notable departure from expected protocol, the Chief Executive Members (CEMs) of the Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills, and Garo Hills Autonomous District Councils (ADCs)—constitutionally empowered and democratically elected institutions—have been sworn into office by District Commissioners (DCs), officials of the state bureaucracy.

At one level, this inversion may appear trivial: a matter of administrative convenience or ceremonial variation. However, such a reading underestimates the constitutive role of ritual in shaping authority and legitimacy. The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution was designed to institutionalise tribal self-governance by granting ADCs legislative, executive, and judicial powers rooted in customary practices (Article 244(2) and 275(1), Indian Constitution). The symbolic reversal of hierarchy in this oath-taking ceremony where elected functionaries are positioned beneath bureaucratic authority signals a deeper disjuncture between constitutional intent and administrative practice. It suggests that autonomy, even when legally enshrined, may be subtly reconfigured through routine institutional acts.

This paper treats the Meghalaya case not as an isolated aberration but as a lens to examine the micro-politics of power in the postcolonial state. Drawing on the Constituent Assembly debates and the vision articulated by Nicholas Roy (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946–49), it interrogates how constitutional promises of self-rule are mediated, and at times undermined, by everyday governance (Bordoloi, 1947). To do so, it mobilises a composite theoretical framework. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the integral state illuminates how power operates through a fusion of coercion and consent, extending beyond formal institutions into civil society (Gramsci, 1971). Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society situates ADCs within an ambivalent domain where formal autonomy coexists with administrative tutelage (Chatterjee, 2004). Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality directs attention to dispersed, routine practices through which authority is enacted and normalised (Foucault, 1978), while Sally Falk Moore’s idea of semi-autonomous social fields foregrounds the interaction of multiple normative orders, state law, customary authority, and bureaucratic rationality (Moore, 1973).

Through this lens, the oath-taking ceremony emerges not as a procedural formality but as a performative site of power, a micro-practice through which hierarchy is enacted, legitimised, and naturalised. Such rituals blur the boundary between state and society, law and practice, autonomy and control, revealing how hegemonic authority is reproduced symbolically. The paper argues that the fragility of tribal self-governance in Meghalaya lies not only in institutional design or legal ambiguity, but in the capacity of the postcolonial state to reassert dominance through subtle, routinised, and symbolically charged practices.
By foregrounding the politics of ritual and normative plurality, this study reorients debates on decentralisation away from formal structures towards the lived realities of governance (Scott, 1998). It shows that autonomy is not merely granted through constitutional text but must be continually performed, recognised, and sustained and that its erosion may begin not with overt intervention, but with the quiet normalisation of symbolic subordination (Bourdieu, 1994).

2.Theoretical Framework: Decentralisation, Hegemony, and the Micro-Politics of Rule

Scholarship on decentralisation in India has largely focused on institutional design, constitutional provisions, and the normative promise of local self-governance (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution has been widely interpreted as a distinctive experiment in asymmetric federalism, designed to accommodate tribal autonomy through the creation of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) endowed with legislative, executive, and judicial powers (Austin, 1999; Hansaria, 2011; Jain, 2016; Tillin, 2013). Early analyses, drawing on the Constituent Assembly debates and the contributions of figures such as Nicholas Roy, emphasised its role in safeguarding customary institutions while integrating tribal regions into the Indian Union (Bordoloi, 1947). Subsequent scholarship has evaluated ADCs in terms of governance outcomes, fiscal capacity, and their relationship with state governments.

However, much of this literature remains confined to a formal-institutional lens, privileging legal provisions and administrative structures over the everyday practices through which authority is enacted and contested (Scott, 1998). Consequently, the symbolic, procedural, and performative dimensions of power—such as ceremonial hierarchies, bureaucratic routines, and ritualised interactions—have received comparatively limited attention (Bourdieu, 1991; Chathukulam & John, 2015). This omission is significant, as it is within such micro-sites that the meaning of autonomy is negotiated and reconstituted.

To address this limitation, the present analysis draws on complementary theoretical interventions that foreground the dispersed and performative nature of power. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony provides a key starting point. For Gramsci, the state extends beyond coercive apparatuses into civil society through the production of consent and the normalisation of authority. His notion of the “integral state” captures this fusion, where domination is sustained not only through force but also through the internalisation of hierarchical relations. In the Meghalaya context, the ritual of oath-taking can be read as a site where such consent is symbolically produced, rendering bureaucratic precedence intelligible and legitimate (Gramsci, 1971).

Building on this, Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society offers a lens to understand the position of ADCs within the postcolonial state. While civil society is associated with ideals of legality and citizenship, political society denotes a domain where populations engage the state through contingent and often extra-legal practices. ADCs, though constitutionally mandated, occupy an ambiguous position: they embody the promise of self-rule yet remain embedded within administrative structures that subject them to ongoing regulation. This ambivalence enables the coexistence of formal autonomy and practical subordination (Chatterjee, 2004).

Foucault’s concept of governmentality further shifts attention from sovereign authority to the techniques and rationalities through which governance operates. Power, in this view, is exercised through routine practices, procedures, and forms of knowledge that shape conduct and define the limits of action. The oath-taking ceremony can thus be understood as a governmental technique—an apparently mundane administrative act that disciplines institutional actors and reinforces configurations of authority (Foucault, 1976).

Moore’s notion of semi-autonomous social fields underscores the plurality of normative orders within which governance unfolds. ADCs operate within a complex legal landscape where state law, customary norms, and bureaucratic procedures intersect and sometimes conflict. These fields are “semi-autonomous” in that they generate internal rules while remaining subject to external pressures. The ceremonial subordination of elected functionaries to bureaucratic authority can therefore be read as an instance where one normative order asserts dominance over others, reshaping the balance between autonomy and control (Moore, 1973).

Taken together, these perspectives enable a shift from viewing decentralisation as a static institutional arrangement to understanding it as a dynamic and contested process (Manor, 1999). They foreground the role of symbolic practices, everyday routines, and overlapping normative frameworks in the production of authority (Bourdieu, 1991; John & Chathukulam, 2003; Moolakkattu, 2009). By applying these insights to the Meghalaya case, this paper argues that the fragility of tribal self-governance cannot be fully understood through constitutional analysis alone but must be located within the micro-politics of rule, where autonomy is continually performed, negotiated, and subtly undone (Scott, 1998; Chatterjee, 2004).

3.The Sixth Schedule: Constitutional Autonomy and its Fragility

Legal Framework and Institutional Design

The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution represents a distinctive experiment in institutionalising differentiated citizenship within the Indian federal framework. Emerging from the Constituent Assembly debates, it sought to reconcile national integration with the protection of tribal autonomy by creating constitutionally sanctioned spaces of self-governance in the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. Rather than assimilating these regions into a uniform administrative structure, it established Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) as hybrid institutions endowed with legislative, executive, and judicial authority (Jain, 2025).

At the level of formal design, the powers of ADCs are substantial. They possess legislative competence over domains such as land, forests, water, and customary law—areas central to both governance and the cultural reproduction of tribal communities. Executive authority is vested in an Executive Committee headed by the Chief Executive Member (CEM), envisioned as operating with autonomy from the state bureaucracy. Additionally, ADCs are empowered to constitute courts that adjudicate according to customary norms, institutionalising legal pluralism in which state law and indigenous practices coexist within a structured hierarchy (Article 244(2) and Article 275(1), Indian Constitution).

These provisions go beyond safeguarding cultural difference; they embed autonomy across multiple institutional registers—lawmaking, administration, and adjudication. ADCs are thus conceived not as subordinate or advisory bodies but as primary agents of governance within their jurisdictions. The Sixth Schedule reflects an ambitious constitutional vision in which self-rule is incorporated within the architecture of the state itself (Umdor and Vanlalhruaitluanga, 2023; Umdor and Vanlalhruaitluanga, 2024).

However, the effectiveness of this framework cannot be assessed solely in formal terms. From a Gramscian perspective, institutional authority does not automatically translate into substantive autonomy unless it is accompanied by the capacity to shape the normative and symbolic order of governance. Similarly, in Chatterjee’s formulation, ADCs occupy an ambiguous position within the postcolonial state: while they embody the promise of self-rule, they function within “political society,” where autonomy is continually negotiated under conditions of administrative oversight.

From a Foucauldian perspective, the Sixth Schedule may be understood as a governmental arrangement that redistributes authority without displacing the rationalities of rule underpinning the modern state. The devolution of power to ADCs coexists with a wider field of bureaucratic practices that regulate and often circumscribe their functioning. Autonomy, in this sense, is not simply granted but embedded within a network of administrative techniques that shape how it is exercised (Dean, 2009; Rose, 1999).

Moore’s notion of semi-autonomous social fields further highlights the plurality of normative orders within which ADCs operate. Customary law, constitutional provisions, and bureaucratic procedures intersect and sometimes conflict, each asserting its own authority. While the Sixth Schedule formally recognises the autonomy of ADCs, it does not preclude intervention or reordering by external state institutions, leaving the boundaries of autonomy inherently porous.

It is within this tension between constitutional promise and administrative practice that the fragility of autonomy becomes evident. While the Sixth Schedule provides a robust formal framework for self-governance, its realisation depends on how authority is enacted and sustained in practice. As the Meghalaya case illustrates, even minor procedural acts can unsettle this balance, revealing the contingent nature of autonomy within broader configurations of postcolonial power (Mbembe, 2001).

4.Historical Context: Constituent Assembly Debates and Nicholas Roy

The design of the Sixth Schedule cannot be fully understood without situating it in the historical deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, where the architecture of tribal autonomy was intensely debated (Constituent Assembly Debates,1946-49; Bordiloi,1947). Roy, representing tribal interests, played a pivotal role in these discussions (Constituent Assembly Debates,1946-49). He argued that tribal areas required institutional mechanisms that preserved customary governance while enabling integration into the Indian Union. Roy’s interventions emphasized two core principles: first, that self-rule must be constitutionally guaranteed and shielded from arbitrary state intervention; and second, that governance should be sensitive to local norms, laws, and social hierarchies (Griffiths,1986; Merry,1988).

Roy’s vision was ambitious. He advocated for legislative, executive, and judicial autonomy within ADCs, recognizing that autonomy is not merely administrative but cultural and normative. His proposals reflected an understanding that decentralization was not a matter of devolving tasks, but of embedding authority in forms that communities themselves could recognize and enact. In contemporary terms, his approach aligns with Moore’s concept of semi-autonomous social fields: institutional autonomy must coexist with local normative orders, enabling councils to operate with meaningful self-determination within broader legal and administrative frameworks (Baruah,2005).

The Constituent Assembly debates also reveal a tension that persists to this day. While the Assembly recognized the legitimacy of tribal self-rule, it simultaneously sought to retain oversight through state mechanisms—a duality that mirrors the contemporary ceremonial inversion. From a Gramscian perspective, this tension reflects the integral state’s logic: formal autonomy is accommodated, but the moral-intellectual leadership of the central apparatus remains paramount. Chatterjee’s framework of civil society and political society further illuminates this ambiguity, portraying ADCs as sites of negotiated authority, where formal powers are exercised in the shadow of state oversight.

Roy’s contributions thus provide both a constitutional ideal and a historical benchmark against which contemporary practices can be measured. The ceremonial inversion in Meghalaya demonstrates how everyday administrative acts can depart from these ideals, exposing the persistent vulnerabilities embedded in the postcolonial state’s governance of tribal regions (Das,2007). It underscores that autonomy, even when constitutionally guaranteed, is always contingent upon its enactment, recognition, and protection within overlapping normative, bureaucratic, and symbolic structures.

5.The Oath-Taking Ceremony in Meghalaya: An Empirical Case

The recent ceremonial inversion in Meghalaya brought the theoretical fragility of autonomy into sharp relief. The CEMs of the Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills, and Garo Hills ADCs constitutionally empowered and democratically elected were administered oaths of office by DCs of their headquarter districts. By conventional interpretation, the act of taking an oath is procedural, almost formalistic. Yet, in the context of Meghalaya’s devolved governance, this inversion is deeply significant: it symbolically positions the state bureaucracy above the functionaries of tribal self-rule (Bourdieu,1991).

At the level of symbolic authority, the ceremony reconfigures hierarchies (Geertz,1977). It signals that ultimate legitimacy is invested not in elected councils but in the administrative apparatus, even when the legal framework envisions otherwise. Drawing on Gramsci, this can be interpreted as a micro-site of hegemonic reproduction: the state consolidates moral and intellectual authority over ostensibly autonomous institutions, producing consent and shaping perceptions of legitimacy through routine practice. In Chatterjee’s terms, the ADCs are rendered semi-autonomous “political society” actors, negotiating formal powers within a wider field dominated by bureaucratic oversight.

From a Foucauldian perspective, the ceremony exemplifies governmentality: authority is enacted and disciplined not through overt coercion but through the regulation of ritualized behaviors, repeated and internalized by institutional actors. Similarly, Moore’s notion of semi-autonomous social fields highlights the complex normative interactions at play. The ADCs, as locally embedded institutions, operate under multiple overlapping orders, customary law, constitutional mandate, and bureaucratic practice. Yet the ceremonial inversion privileges one normative hierarchy over others, subtly constraining the exercise of autonomy.

Empirically, the Meghalaya oath-taking case demonstrates that autonomy is performative and contingent. Even when constitutional authority is formally intact, symbolic subordination through everyday administrative acts can erode the legitimacy and operational freedom of tribal self-governance. The inversion is therefore not merely ceremonial; it exemplifies how hegemonic power circulates in subtle, routinized ways within postcolonial decentralization (Chandhoke,1995).

6. Analysis: Ritual, Hegemony, and the Fragility of Autonomy in Meghalaya

The oath-taking ceremony in Meghalaya is not merely a procedural anomaly but a revealing lens into the micro-politics of postcolonial governance. The inversion—where Chief Executive Members (CEMs) of the Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills, and Garo Hills ADCs take oaths before District Commissioners (DCs)—symbolically enacts a hierarchy privileging bureaucratic authority over constitutionally autonomous institutions.
Although the Sixth Schedule empowers ADCs to legislate, administer, and adjudicate, the ceremonial order suggests that legitimacy flows from the state apparatus rather than elected office or customary authority.

From a Gramscian perspective, this ritual operates as a site of hegemonic production. Hegemony functions through a fusion of coercion and consent, where subordinate actors internalize the logic of dominance.
The inversion of oath-taking embeds bureaucratic supremacy within routine practice, normalizing the symbolic subordination of local authority (Bourdieu, 1991). While elected representatives formally hold autonomous powers, ritualized precedence constructs a field in which their authority is implicitly circumscribed.

Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society deepens this analysis. ADCs, though constitutionally recognised, occupy what he terms “political society”—a domain where legality and autonomy are mediated through negotiation and administrative oversight. In this space, autonomy is inherently provisional: councils exercise formal powers but do so under the persistent shadow of state authority. The Meghalaya case thus demonstrates that constitutional design alone cannot guarantee self-rule; legitimacy must also be enacted and socially recognised.

Foucault’s concept of governmentality highlights how such power operates through dispersed techniques rather than overt coercion. The oath-taking ceremony exemplifies this subtlety: a routine administrative act that regulates behaviour, shapes expectations, and reproduces hierarchical relations. Through repetition, such practices discipline institutional actors and reinforce the normative dominance of the state, even within spaces formally designated for autonomy. The ritual thus functions as a micro-practice of governance, sustaining control through symbolic means.

Moore’s (1973) notion of semi-autonomous social fields further illuminates the complex normative terrain in which ADCs function. These councils operate at the intersection of customary law, constitutional mandates, and bureaucratic procedures, each asserting distinct claims to authority. Ceremonial practices like oath-taking privilege one order over others, subtly reshaping the operational meaning of autonomy. Over time, the repetition of such rituals normalizes bureaucratic dominance, producing a context where autonomy exists in law but is constrained in practice.

A historical reading of the Constituent Assembly debates, particularly the interventions of Roy, underscores the divergence between constitutional intent and contemporary practice. Roy envisioned ADCs as genuinely autonomous institutions embedding tribal norms and local governance within the Indian state. The present ceremonial inversion departs from this vision, revealing the fragility of autonomy in the postcolonial context. While Roy’s framework emphasised recognition of local agency, ritualised bureaucratic precedence reasserts the moral and intellectual authority of the state over tribal institutions.

Taken together, these perspectives show that autonomy is neither fixed nor guaranteed by constitutional provisions alone. It is performative, relational, and contingent upon the interplay of symbolic, administrative, and normative forces (Chatterjee, 2004). The Meghalaya oath-taking ceremony demonstrates how everyday practices reproduce hegemonic power, mediate self-rule, and subtly erode democratic legitimacy. The fragility of tribal self-governance thus stems not from legal inadequacy but from the state’s capacity to govern through dispersed, routine, and symbolically charged acts.

In sum, the case highlights the structural tensions within India’s decentralised governance of tribal areas, where legal autonomy, customary legitimacy, and bureaucratic authority coexist uneasily. Ceremonial practices such as oath-taking crystallise these tensions, making visible the contested nature of authority (Baruah, 2005; Chatterjee, 2004; Gupta, 2012; Das, 2007). The Meghalaya anomaly illustrates a broader principle of postcolonial governance: autonomy remains provisional, enacted within hierarchies of power, and contingent upon recognition across intersecting normative orders.

7. Symbolic Authority and the Long Arc of Decentralization

Over decades of observing and engaging with decentralized governance across India’s Northeast, one notices a recurring pattern: constitutional design and administrative practice often diverge, especially when autonomy intersects with entrenched bureaucratic structures. In Meghalaya, the inversion of oath-taking is emblematic of a subtle but persistent phenomenon: autonomous institutions being symbolically subordinated, even when legally empowered.

Years of field experience reveal that such inversions are rarely accidental. They often emerge from a bureaucratic logic that prioritizes hierarchy, administrative order, and state visibility over constitutional spirit. In practice, this undermines local agency, sending signals to elected functionaries, staff, and communities that autonomy is contingent, performative, and negotiable.

This subtle erosion is particularly consequential in tribal regions, where local governance carries historical, cultural, and symbolic weight. The ceremonial inversion in Meghalaya is thus not merely procedural; it is a window into the long-term fragility of democratic decentralization, highlighting the discrepancy between legal empowerment and socially recognized authority (Baruah,2005; Chatterjee,2004; Bourdieu,1991; Turner,1969; Das,2007).

8. Gramsci Revisited: Rituals as Sites of Hegemony

Gramsci’s insights on the interplay between formal state power and civil society illuminate why ceremonial inversion matters. Gramsci posited that hegemony is maintained not only through coercion but through everyday practices, rituals, and cultural norms. When elected CEMs take oaths before DCs, the state asserts symbolic hegemony, subtly conditioning citizens and officials to view bureaucratic authority as supreme.

From a Gramscian perspective, the inversion functions as a ritualized exercise of cultural-political power. It demonstrates that authority is not solely codified in law but produced and recognized through everyday enactments, ceremonies, and protocols. In this sense, autonomy cannot exist solely on paper; it requires continuous symbolic reinforcement. The Meghalaya case demonstrates that without attention to these dimensions, even constitutionally enshrined autonomy can be effectively hollowed out.

9. Decades of Experience: Patterns and Lessons

Reflecting on my four decades of engagement with decentralized governance, several patterns emerge:
Legal authority is insufficient without ritual recognition. Autonomous bodies may have full statutory powers, yet their legitimacy in practice depends on the perception of authority by officials, communities, and courts.

Bureaucratic default to hierarchy undermines autonomy. In regions with strong bureaucratic presence, ceremonial precedence often mirrors administrative convenience, rather than democratic or constitutional design.

Symbolic subordination has long-term consequences. When rituals consistently place autonomous leaders below state officers, elected institutions lose credibility, community engagement suffers, and the practical scope of decision-making narrows.

These patterns are evident in Meghalaya’s current inversion. While the legal mandate of ADCs remains intact, the symbolic subordination weakens the councils’ functional and perceived autonomy, demonstrating how subtle procedural details can shape the trajectory of democratic governance over decades.

The Role of Ritual in Legitimacy

Rituals, ceremonies, and symbolic acts are central to how authority is recognized and internalized by both officials and communities. In the absence of proper ritual acknowledgment, legal mandates may remain abstract or contested (Bourdieu,1991; Turner,1969; Geet,1977; Das,2007). In Meghalaya, the ceremonial inversion transforms the oath-taking from a declaration of local autonomy into a reinforcement of state supremacy, implicitly signaling that democratic authority is conditional on bureaucratic approval.

Such rituals are not peripheral; they are constitutive acts that enact and reaffirm governance structures. When rituals contravene constitutional design, they reshape perceptions of legitimacy, eroding autonomy without any formal legal intervention. This underscores a crucial insight: in decentralized governance, the symbolic is inseparable from the legal.

10. Constitutional Tensions: Law vs. Practice

The Meghalaya case highlights an enduring tension in the 6th Schedule framework: the law guarantees autonomy, but practice may undermine it. This tension arises from multiple sources:

Bureaucratic inertia: Administrators are trained to prioritize hierarchy and control, often unconsciously subordinating elected institutions.

Lack of ritual codification: While the law details the powers of councils, it rarely specifies ceremonial precedence, leaving space for administrative discretion to shape symbolic authority.
Historical precedent: Over decades, even minor procedural deviations become normalized, reinforcing hierarchical norms that erode the intended autonomy.

Decades of my observation and engagement in decentralization reveal that such tensions are neither accidental nor easily resolved. They require active recognition,

11.Towards a Normative Reordering

Addressing these issues requires attention to both law and practice:
• Codify ceremonial precedence: Legal provisions should explicitly recognize ritual autonomy, ensuring that elected CEMs are ceremonially acknowledged as primary authorities.
• Training and sensitization: Bureaucrats should be sensitized to the symbolic and constitutional importance of autonomy, reducing unintentional subordination.
• Public recognition: Civic engagement and civil society should reinforce the primacy of elected councils, ensuring that autonomy is publicly visible and socially respected.

Such measures are essential to preserve the integrity of tribal self-governance and ensure that autonomy is enacted in both law and practice.

12. Conclusion: Autonomy, Ritual, and the Practice of Democracy

The inversion of oath-taking in Meghalaya reveals a fundamental lesson: autonomy is fragile, symbolic, and contingent. Even when legally guaranteed, democratic institutions can be undermined through ceremonial subordination and routine administrative practices. Over decades, subtle rituals shape perceptions of authority, reinforcing hierarchies that may contradict constitutional design. Through the lens of Gramsci, the Meghalaya case demonstrates how everyday practices produce hegemonic legitimacy, privileging bureaucratic authority over elected councils. Roy’s vision of meaningful autonomy — both recognized and enacted — is compromised when ritual subordination obscures democratic authority.

Decentralization is more than statutes, elections, or powers on paper. It is performed, acknowledged, and reinforced through ritual, symbolic enactments, and social recognition. Meghalaya’s inversion is a cautionary tale: procedural minutiae matter and neglecting the symbolic dimensions of autonomy risks eroding the very democratic principles that the Sixth Schedule seeks to uphold. In sum, this case compels scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to recognize that law without ritual enactment is incomplete, and democracy without symbolic recognition is fragile. The health of tribal self-governance depends as much on ceremonial legitimacy as on constitutional mandate.

(Author: Jos Chathukulam is former Professor, Ramakrishna Hegde Chair on Decentralisation and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru and currently the Director of Centre for Rural Management (CRM), Kottayam, Kerala. Email: joschathukulam[at]gmail.com)

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