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Mainstream, Vol XLV, No 29

India-United States Nuclear Deal : Issues and Challenges

Saturday 7 July 2007, by M J Vinod



The India-US nuclear deal has been projected as a turning point in the relationship between the two countries. The deal has been the subject of intense debate and discussion among strategic experts, the scientific community and the mass public of both the US and India. It signalled the end to the isolation of the Indian nuclear industry. perhaps it is also a recognition of India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. The July 2005 “Joint Statement” on civilian nuclear cooperation represented the most decisive step on the part of the US in demonstrating its readiness to “treat India differently”—from a nuclear pariah to a partner. The Bush Administration broke the mould by finding a nuclear modus vivendi with India. (Parag Khanna and C. Raja Mohan: 2006) It has also opened out the eyes of the international community to resume civilian nuclear cooperation with India. The basis of the India-US agreement is the de facto acceptance of India’s nuclear military programme. With the passing of the Hyde Act in December 2006, one would also need to look into the extent to which the Act deviates from the ‘letter’ and ‘spirit’ of the July 18 Joint Statement. One also needs to look into the extent to which the Indian Government is bound by American domestic laws vis-à-vis a bilateral agreement like the 123 Agreement which is currently being negotiated.

The nuclear agreement signed on July 18, 2005 set forth the following commitments on the Indian side:

• Identification and separation of civilian and nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner;

• Filling a declaration of its civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing ‘voluntarily’ its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and

• Signing and adhering to an ‘Additional Protocol’ (AP) for the civilian nuclear facilities. (R. Ramachandran: 2005)

Status of India’s Nuclear Programme

CURRENTLY India has fifteen operating nuclear power reactors, seven more are under construction, and several others planned. This growth is partly driven by India’s energy requirements in the context of its economic growth. Four of India’s reactors are currently under IAEA safeguards. In addition the Tarapur plutonium reprocessing facility is safeguarded when ‘safeguarded fuel’ is being processed, and the Tarapur mixed-oxide fuel-fabrication plant has safeguards when ‘safeguarded material’ is being used. The Hyderabad fuel-fabrication plant has ‘partial’ safeguards. Key nuclear weapons-related facilities presently not subject to IAEA inspections include the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which houses the CIRUS and DHRUVA research reactors for plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants and a pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant. (Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams: 2006)
An important document tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006 observes that

The resumption of full civilian cooperation between India and the US arose in the context of India’s requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess. (The Hindu, March 8, 2006)

India will place 14 of the 22 nuclear power reactors in the civilian list, as well as many associated facilities like heavy water plants and research institutions. The Indo-US nuclear deal can have far-reaching implications, particularly because there are certain aspects of the agreement that involves India signing up on treaties on perpetuity. The question that needs to be raised is whether the deal would affect India’s strategic or energy research and development programme. Or even its three-stage power programme. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Anil Kakodkar, has revealed that India has plans to build eight new thermal reactors, including four indigenous 700 MW pressurised heavy water reactors and four imported light water reactors, besides four fast reactors and one prototype fast breeder reactor. (The Hindu, March 10, 2007) India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor by 2010. It is also prepared to shift the fuel of the APSARA reactor that was purchased from France outside the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and make the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards in 2010. India needs to take measures to deal with interruptions in fuel supplies and when such a situation may arise. Broadly India will place 14 nuclear facilities on the civilian list by the year 2014. The deal will significantly increase the number of nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Presently only four of India’s nuclear power reactors are under safeguards.

Nuclear Deal and Minimum Deterrence

ONE also needs to look into the extent to which the deal impinges on the ‘credibility’ of India’s minimum nuclear deterrence. Will the deal constrain India’s nuclear weapons programme? This is much more a question of interpretation. India’s consistent perception has been that the deal has more to do with energy security and less to do with arms control. India, as is well known, has a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapon testing. There is a strong view that Washington is trying to legally institutionalise India’s unilateral moratorium. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had confirmed that the civil and nuclear facilities separation plan would
not limit our option now or in the future to address evolving threat scenarios with appropriate responses consistent with our nuclear policy of restraint and responsibility. (Amit Baruah: 2006)

India, as the Prime Minister contested, has taken care of its current and future ‘deterrence’ requirements.

The US is trying to tie the assurances of perpetual fuel supply—as envisaged by the Indian nuclear separation plan—into a ‘no nuclear testing condition’. These clauses form part of the ‘bracketed’ portion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (the so-called 123 Agreement) currently being negotiated by both the countries. If the government of any given day thinks it prudent to conduct a test, it would be free to do so. The consequence, however, would be for the US and the Nuclear Supplies Group to end their nuclearcooperation with India. Provided India is able to withdraw its civilian facilities from the “in perpetuity” IAEA safeguards, the clock, in effect, would be turned back to the status quo ante of July 2005. (Siddharth Varadarajan: 2006)

The American President will have to certify every year that he is satisfied with the behaviour and programmes of India in the nuclear field, especially with respect to the augmentation of the nuclear arsenal. P. K. Iyengar, the former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, contends that additions to the agreement of July 18, 2005 would, in effect, cap India’s strategic programme for a minimum credible deterrent. His contention is that it is not clear whether India would have an option of accelerating its own well-established nuclear power programme based on the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor.

Nuclear Deal and IAEA India-Specific Safeguards

INDIA has experience with the IAEA safeguards on reactors (TAPS 1 and 2, RAPS 1 and 2) fuel fabrication at NFC where important enriched uranium is processed, fuel reprocessing + on a campaign mode when treating spent fuel from RAPS 1 and 2 and the Away from Reactor Storage of spent fuel at Tarapur. The Indian case is unique in the sense that it is neither a nuclear weapon state nor a non-weapon state as envisaged by the NPT. Hence the ‘safeguards’ and the ‘additional protocol’ will be India-specific. In the case of a nuclear weapon state in the NPT a state could put a facility on the civilian list and then withdraw it. But in India’s case it will not be permitted to shift a facility from the civilian to the military. In other words, the safeguard will be permanent for the facility; but then the fuel supplies for it will also be permanent. Under the deal India will even be able to stockpile the imported uranium for its civilian reactors, which would of course be subjected to safeguards.

Technically India does not object to the IAEA safeguards. The problem India would have is related to the following:

• To accept any obligation to inform the IAEA about activities undertaken at the R and D centres;

• To accept any obligation to inform the IAEA about manufacturing on production facilities not notified as civilian;

• It would be difficult for India to share any information that is related to national security with the IAEA.

As per the deal, India has committed itself to negotiating a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for its civilian nuclear facilities. The Americans are clear that India cannot have ‘conditional’ safeguards, but only ‘permanent’ safeguards. As per this plan, India will place 14 of its 22 thermal nuclear reactors under international safeguards by the year 2014. The US has been insisting that the CIRUS reactor be placed under safeguards, since it was built with foreign collaboration. However, India has been hesitant to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), which is a ‘strategic facility’ where the CIRUS is located. Hence India has decided to shut down the CIRUS reactor by the year 2010. In the case of APSARA, India will take out its French supplied nuclear core and will not close down the reactor at the BARC.

It may be recalled that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had observed that India-specific safeguards would provide for protection against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, while permitting the country to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Before voluntarily placing its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, India needs to ensure that all restrictions on India are lifted. The Prime Minister has contended that India’s autonomy will not be circumscribed in any manner whatsoever. (The Hindu, July 9, 2006) The Senate has added acceptability by India of ‘IAEA standards and principles’. The purpose behind this is to perhaps push India towards a tighter inspections regime for the facilities to be safeguarded. The safeguards cannot be like any other NPT country. They are India-specific arrangements, recognising the reality that India has a nuclear weapons programme. As far as future reactors are concerned, India has to place all its future civilian reactors under safeguards. However, India reserves to itself the right to classify future reactors as civilian or military.

India has agreed to in-perpetuity safeguards for its indigenous civilian nuclear activities in exchange for US assurances of perpetual fuel supply for all reactors that go under safeguards. All the five nuclear weapon states unlike India have the right to redesignate safeguarded civilian facilities as military should they so desire. Perhaps it may not help India to redesignate its safeguarded facilities, since the amount of fissile material produced by the unsafeguarded reactors would be sufficient for any strategic programme based on minimum deterrence. What is at stake, however, is the question of assured fuel supply for the safeguarded reactors. However, when it comes to the issue of negotiating an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, India will have to insist on the kind of exclusions the US has written into its document so as to protect its proprietary technologies as well as national security. (The Hindu, March 3, 2006) The five established nuclear weapon powers, under voluntary accords, offer nuclear materials and facilities for IAEA inspections in name only. The IAEA, in turn, carries out token inspections or often no inspections ‘to conserve resources’. Out of 915 nuclear facilities the IAEA inspects worldwide, only 11 are those of the nuclear weapon states. (Brahma Chellaney: 2006)

All ‘future’ fast-breeder reactors producing power would be put under IAEA safeguards and the ‘nature’ of the safeguards agreement is not clear at this point of time. (P.K. Iyengar: 2006) The US President is required to submit a report by January 31 every year. It will contain the following:

• An estimate of the uranium mined in India in the previous year.

• The amount of uranium used or allocated for making nuclear devices.

• The rate of production of fissile material.

The Senate version of the Bill had in fact carved out a ‘separate’ layer of supervision under the theme of ‘end-use’ monitoring. It visualised that any nuclear material, equipment and technology exported to India by the US would be subject to not just the IAEA safeguards, but an ‘end-use monitoring’ programme to be monitored by US inspectors who would acquire the same degree of access as the IAEA inspectors. Perhaps as the days go by the safeguards issue will turn out to be even more contentious than separation. The US insists that the separation plan has to be ‘credible’, ‘transparent’ and ‘defensible’. One wonders whether this means that the US will be the judge to whom India has to report and can monitor on a continuous basis.

The US has floated the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) which is a research and technology development initiative. India has been denied full access to the GNEP because it has refused to place one of its fast breeder reactors under safeguards. It aims at expansion of the nuclear power programme in the world in a way that will reprocess spent fuel using new proliferation-resistant technology. It will also address the question of how to dispose nuclear waste safely and build reactors that are cost-effective and can be scaled up according to different countries’ requirements. (The Hindu, September 30, 2006)

The Nuclear Deal and Energy Security

INDIA has contended that the nuclear deal with the US would widen its energy options. The greater the Indian dependence on imported safeguarded reactors for its electricity grid, the greater would be the cost associated with the suspension of nuclear cooperation that would follow any test. India has been negotiating the deal with the US on the premise that it is an agreement about civil nuclear energy cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit. A country like France has gone in for a high share (over 70 per cent) for nuclear in its energy production. Even India’s three-stage nuclear programme—namely, first, heavy water reactor using natural uranium; secondly, fast breeder reactors using plutonium fuel; and thirdly, to set up systems for thorium utilisation—is based on the principle of energy security. India needs to make sure that there is nothing in the deal that interferes with its three-stage nuclear programme. (Placid Rodriguez: 2006)

Robert Blackwill, the former US Ambassador to India, contends that the deal would make a major contribution towards mitigating India’s energy deficits, which would otherwise undermine its efforts to reach an eight per cent GNP growth rate over the next two decades, and bring hundreds and millions of Indians out of abject poverty. It would lessen India’s weight on the world energy market and prices. It would help arrest pressures in India on its large reserves of dirty coal, which would contribute to the degradation of the global environment. Finally assisting India to optimise its energy mix would open the door to reviving the US nuclear industry by providing it with opportunities for export of a range of technologies and services to the Indian nuclear market. (Robert W. Blackwill, 2006)

The US ambassador to India, David Mulford, contends that the deal is an “answer to India’s long-term energy problems”. Critics, however, argue that importing high-priced reactor dependent on imported fuel makes little economic or strategic sense.

If India plans to build 20,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity in the next two decades, it must be prepared to invest Rs 200,000 crores at a minimum over the same period. India’s ability to build nuclear reactors has come at a cost of approximately Rs 7 crores to Rs 8 crores per megawatt. Of course once built, nuclear plants have a much longer life-span than their coal or gas counterparts. Another dimension is that the global race to build more nuclear reactors could well push the global market price of uranium. (Sudha Mahalingam: 2006) Perhaps it is tempting to believe that nuclear power constitutes the grand panacea for all of India’s energy needs. Central to India’s vision of energy security is its stand that the closed nuclear fuel cycle is crucial for implementation of its three-stage nuclear programme, with its long-term objective of tapping vast energy available in thorium resources in India. This has been the consistent stand taken by Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He opines that thorium utilisation is the long-term core objective of the Indian nuclear power programme for providing energy independence on a ‘sustainable basis’. Hence the third stage of the programme is based on thorium-uranium-233 cycle.

Nuclear Deal and Political and Strategic Concerns

THE India-US nuclear deal has raised some political and strategic concerns. Many writers spoke of the possibility of certain hidden ‘costs’ for India vis-à-vis the US offer of nuclear cooperation. That there were collateral political goals and implications were perhaps obvious. It may be recalled that almost at the time the deal was signed, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had publicly raised the US opposition to the Iran-India pipeline. Much discussion continues over whether the deal would compromise on India’s ‘strategic autonomy’. The Republicans, who at one time were a vehement critic of India, believe that the nuclear deal “has a lot of merit” and that India would be a greater ally of the US and a “good partner down the road”. (The Hindu, June 29, 2007)
Technically the India-US nuclear deal is about civilian nuclear energy cooperation and not about India’s strategic programme. The argument that the deal would enhance India’s strategic capacity is also misplaced, as the opposite extreme view that it would cripple our programme is also perhaps not true, as the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has repeatedly pointed out. The Indian point is clear that the civilian nuclear deal with the US will in no way facilitate an expansion of India’s nuclear weapons programme. India’s Foreign Secretary, at an interaction at the Heritage Foundation, brushed aside suggestions that the separation of military and civil nuclear facilities would open the possibility of a massive increase in New Delhi’s weapons programme. (The Hindu, March 31, 2006)
US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns had told the Congressional Task Force on US-India Trade and the US-India Business Alliance in Washington on June 22, 2006 that the Congress has to be convinced that
this particular piece of legislation (Hyde Bill at that stage) being proposed by the Administration is in our national interest. We think it is good for our strategic relationship, good for non-proliferation regimes. It is a ‘winner’ for the US on all counts.
(The Hindu, June 23, 2007)
The deal has a strong security rationale according to him as it would enable India to make a ‘fuller contribution’ to global non-proliferationefforts. India, as President Bush said on one occasion, can be trusted and has proved itself over thirty years to be a non-proliferator. It is the strategic costs of proximity to the US that India has to be conscious of.

Nuclear Deal and the Non-Proliferation Regime

BHARAT KARNAD, the well-known defence analyst, contends that
the kind of things mentioned in the preamble of the deal has all things like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty and the Iran issue. (Bharat Karnad: 2006)
Well known nuclear scientist Homi Sethna has opined that India would be better off signing the NPT, which permitted the exit of any signatory nation, rather than the nuclear deal with the US that would bind the country for perpetuity.
However, experts like David Albright, Leonard Weiss and Daryl G. Kimball had, in a briefing at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on February 16, 2006, feared that India’s reluctance to place all its reactors under permanent inspections
smacked ofa clandestine effort to increase weapons production, and also belied the Bush Administration’s contention that the deal would bring into compliance with the non-proliferation regime.
Their point was that India’s separation plan did not justify changes in US non-proliferation laws on international norms to make far-reaching exceptions to allow transfer of sensitive civilian nuclear technology. (The Hindu, February 17, 2006) However, a person like Gary Ackerman, the co-chair of the India Caucus, strongly feels that it is “better to have India inside the non-proliferation system than outside”.

Discussions over the 123 Agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

THE 123 Agreement is crucial for operationalising the nuclear deal. India would not like to be denied its right to reprocess the fuel it gets from outside, whether it is natural uranium or enriched uranium, as India needs the uranium for its fast breeder reactors and thorium utilisation programme. US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns has said that it is India’s right to reprocess the spent fuel. This needs to be reflected in the 123 Agreement between the two countries. India would not like to have a repetition of Tarapur, where India has not been allowed to process the spent fuel accumulating there, nor return the fuel to the US. M. R. Srinivasan, a Member of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, strongly feels that Indian negotiators must insist that the 123 Agreement recognise India’s sovereign right to reprocess nuclear fuel, whether enriched or natural uranium, imported from any country and to use such fuel in safeguarded facilities. (M. R. Srinivasan: 2006)

The US is keen to write into the 123 agreements a provision for “special verification visits” in the event the IAEA is unable to implement its safeguards agreement with India. The US has, by amending the NSG rule, ensured a level playing field for its own contractors once the Indian nuclear industry is opened for business. Section 123(a)(1) of the US Atomic Energy Act (AEA) mentions the provision of fallback safeguard. India finds such a provision intrusive. The problem here is that buying French or Russian equipment as a way of avoiding US conditionalities may no longer be an option since the NSG guidelines mandating fallback safeguards may not be amended: (Siddharth Varadarajan: 2006) Until now India has maintained that it will not allow the US access beyond what is envisaged by the “End-Use Verification Agreement” signed as part of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership in 2004. This provides the US inspectors to visit the “balance of plant” (that is, non-reactor) portion of an Indian nuclear facility where any American dual-use item might be used. The 123 Agreement, once finalised, will have to be submitted to the US Congress for approval, following which the US firms can sell nuclear equipment, technology and material to India.


THE overall picture is rather ‘foggy’ at this stage. The India-US nuclear deal is a historic agreement that perhaps brings India into the non-proliferation mainstream. The deal raised fundamental questions about the future of the non-proliferation regime. A whole debate still continues about the extent to which the deal is a judicious mix between India’s long-term energy and security interests and the expectation of the international community to insulate as many of India’s nuclear plants from potential military applications. In India there has been a strong perception in certain quarters that India is somehow being manoeuvred into surrendering its autonomy.
The whole deal is ‘supply’ related, that is, no supply no safeguards. Hence perhaps it would not be too problematical to place some of the segregated civilian unclear facilities under perpetual safeguards. However, as far as key strategic hubs like Trombay and Kalpakkam are concerned, they should be best kept off the IAEA safeguards arrangement. So should be the third and fourth 540 MW heavy water power reactors at Tarapur. This will mean that the fast breeder development programme as well as the work required for the country’s three-stage civilian nuclear power strategy can go ahead. The July 2005 agreement and the separation plan of March 2006 do not cap India’s strategic programme. Perhaps the political class will now get a better sense of the cost of the nuclear weapons programme, since it will no longer be embedded within the civilian power programme. This could lead to a more prudent strategic posture, and avoiding a nuclear arms race in South Asia. India does not have mountains of plutonium, and hence what India has kept out is perhaps consistent with its defence needs. Till the deal was entered into theoretically all the facilities were available for India’s weapons programme. Now the upper limit is only 35 per cent. Access to fissile materials does not mean that India use all that for weapon-making. If a country like China, which has rather strained ties with the US, can access civilian nuclear technology without sacrificing its weapons programme, then it seems odd that it is denied to India. Needless to say this is in spite of India’s impeccable record.
The deal may increase India’s reliance on imported fuel, which could make India susceptible to external pressure. Hence it would be in India’sinterest to shift to relying on thorium, which could take two or three decades. Thus of now India would require a adequate base of heavy water and light water reactors to produce enough plutonium to start a series of fast breeder reactors. If there are interruptions of fuel supplies, then India would have to take corrective measures to deal with them. This will have to be part of the understanding with the IAEA.

What the July 2005 agreement contemplated was adjusting US laws to ensure ‘full’ civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. But what we now see is something less than full. The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, had consistently pointed out that India will not settle for anything less than “full civil nuclear energy cooperation”, including the right to reprocess spent fuel and access to technology and equipment connected to the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Since the Henry Hyde US-India Nuclear Cooperation Act does not guarantee India these rights, the Indian Government hopes that the 123 Agreement will seriously address India’s concerns. The US has had its way on the issue of “in-perpetuity” safeguards, though Indian officials contend that they have grafted in an exit clause in case fuel supplies are cut off. Neither does the US allow its supplies to be reprocessed, nor does it allow the spent fuel to be sent back to the US. India does not want a repetition of Tarapur, being saddled with stockpiles of spent fuel, which are not only hazardous but also expensive to maintain. (Nilova Roy Chaudhary: 2007) The US has made waivers to this condition for Japan, Switzerland and the European Union, and India is perhaps hoping a similar exception will be made in its case too.

The questions about sequencing each side has committed itself to remain. The Prime Minister has categorically assured that Indian facilities would not go under safeguards until all US and Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions were “irreversibly” lifted. Two sequencing issues, as Siddharth Varadarajan observes, still remain: one, it is not clear when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines will be changed. Secondly, Indian negotiators believe the safeguards agreement with the IAEA should ideally be finalised after the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (the 123 Agreement) is fully negotiated.

• The Prime Minister has also assured the nation that India would insist on “full” civil nuclear cooperation, including the right to access technologies related to the nuclear fuel cycle, which the Senate version of the bill had denied;

• the separation of the civilian and military nuclear facilities India has undertaken to carry out; and

• The nature of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA: India has ruled out the possibility of US inspectors entering Indian nuclear installations (fallback safeguards).

Whether the deal will turn out to be a win-win situation for either side only time will tell. The outcome of the deal is bound to have an immediate and long-term bearing on relations between New Delhi and Washington. The outcome of the 123 negotiations would decide the future of the deal. On the Indian side this needs to be done without compromising beyond a point on our energy needs and our sovereignty. Only time will tell whether the nuclear deal represents a paradigm shift in India-US ties or not.


Nilova Roy Chaudhury, “123 Push to Nuclear Deal”, Hindustan Times, March 23, 2007.

M.R. Srinivasan, “Remember Lessons From Tarapur”, The Hindu, December 26, 2006.

Siddharth Varadarajan, “NSG Rule gives US Firms ‘Level Playing Field’ with India”, The Hindu, December 12, 2006.

Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “Seizing the Moment: Using the US-Indian Nuclear Deal to Improve Fissile Material Security”, Arms Control Today, May 2006, pp. 12-17.

Siddharth Varadarajan, “The Nuclear Deal and Minimum Deterrence”, The Hindu, Chennai, July 10, 2006.

“Experts Express Concern over Nuclear Deal with US”, The Hindu, July 3, 2006.

“Deal won’t Impact on India’s Strategic Programme”, The Hindu, June 24, 2006.

Sudha Mahalingam, “Nuclear Power and the Mirage of Energy Security”, The Hindu, March 16, 2006.

Amit Baruah, “No Cap on India’s Strategic Programme”, The Hindu, March 12, 2006.

Robert W. Blackwill, “The Road Not Travelled: US Nuclear Offer Indicates Foresight, Statesmanship”, The Times of India, March 2, 2006.

Parag Khanna and C. Raja Mohan, “Getting India Right”, Policy Review 135, February/March 2006, pp. 43-61.

Placid Rodriguez, “The Nuclear Deal: What if it Falls Through”, The Hindu, February 28, 2006.

Michael Krepon, “In Pursuit of a Nuclear Deal with India”, The Hindu, February 24, 2006.

Brahma Chellaney, “Washington’s Ever Shifting Goalpost”, The Hindu, February 15, 2006.

R. Ramachandran, “Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEA Safeguards”, Strategic Analysis, 29: 4, October-November 2005, pp. 574-592.

The author is a Professor, Department of Political Science, Bangalore University.

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