Towards Structuring History

Compared to many of the Western countries, India has a poor harvest of memoirs and reminiscences by those who had held important positions in the wielding of the machinery of power. Many British statesmen, generals and administrators left behind copious documents from memory which provide the raw material of history. In contrast, we seem to have developed an unhistorical tradition, neglecting this important aspect of recording history.

It is in this context that one has to evaluate the significance of the revival of interest about the Simla Accord of 1972, particularly the understanding between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The question revolves round the specific issue: was there any understanding between the two leaders about Kashmir, and what really was the significance of re-christening the old ceasefire line into the line of control? At one time, particularly when Indira Gandhi was dislodged from power in 1977, there was speculation about a secret deal, a secret clause to the Simla Accord. The rumour was scotched and even the implacable opponents of Indira Gandhi did not pursue the matter, as there is reason to believe that the Foreign Minister of the Janata Party Government, Atal Behari Vajpayee, was aware of the real position with regard to this matter.

Recently the question has come up in a strange fashion. The Foreign Secretary at the time of the Simla talks was T.N. Kaul. He has recently published a book of memoirs, My Years Through Raj to Swaraj, in which he has sought to dismiss the impression that there was an understanding between Indira and Bhutto. According to Kaul, neither of them “indicated to the other even the rough physical parameters of a possible final settlement”. This claim by Kaul has been effectively demolished by Prof P.N. Dhar, who was then the Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Both Kaul and Dhar were privy to the Simla talks. As Dhar has explained in great detail in an article in Mainstream (April 15, 1995), there was a last-minute understanding between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which led to the midnight signing of the Simla Agreement. Those who were present at Simla during those memorable days would recall that by the afternoon of the final day there was a deadlock and it was taken that the talks had broken down. In fact, Indira’s Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul, left Simla by car in late afternoon, which led some alert mediapersons to come to the mistaken conclusion that the negotiations had really broken down.

It was precisely from this very point that P.N. Dhar picked up the thread and gave a detailed account as to what really happened. It is this account by P.N. Dhar which provides the clue to the significance of the change in the nomenclature from ‘ceasefire line’ to ‘Line of Control’—with it was linked the perspective of a final solution to the Indo-Pak acrimony over Kashmir. Dhar explains that subsequently Bhutto could not keep to his part of the understanding—probably he was overwhelmed by the pressure of domestic events—and that led to its virtual burial. At the same time, it is important for posterity to note the important development as a significant initiative in the history of Indo-Pak relations.

There were other important participants in the Simla talks whose memoirs or personal papers should be made known to the public for a more informed appraisal of the event. D.P. Dhar, for instance, was sent by Indira Gandhi to talk to Bhutto to prepare the agenda for the Simla meeting. Dhar brought the transcript of his talk with the Pakistan leader which should throw a lot of light on the complexities of Pakistani diplomacy at Simla. In fact, through the greater part of 1971, there were important encounters between Indian and Pakistani leaders whose records should be available.

Earlier, when the Indo-Pak talks were held in the wake of the Chinese aggression on the Indian frontier in October-November 1962, the important participants could have left behind valuable material for the construction of an authentic history of such important develop-ments. Gundevia, then a senior official in the Foreign Office who had accompanied Sardar Swaran Singh in his talks with the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Bhutto, left behind a very useful account of the talks in his memoirs which came out in two volumes. One does not know if Sardar Swaran Singh himself left behind any notes of the many important events which he covered during his crowded career as a distinguished Minister at the Centre. He was not at all inaccessible but neither the media-persons nor the scholars bothered to interact with him and get at the root of some of the most intractable events in our foreign affairs.

The Sino-Indian relations passed through ups and downs, but very little has been contributed towards reconstructing them by those directly involved in them. The only exception was Major General Palit whose account of the military debacle in 1962 provides invaluable insights. But all the others have practically kept silent over what they themselves had seen or done. The crisis of 1962 came as a traumatic shock for Nehru who had to swallow his pride in writing to President Kennedy beseeching military assistance to ward off the Chinese aggression. Very few people outside the government knew about the existence of this letter—though some of the more responsible journalists had knowledge about it—and it was later that Sudhir Ghosh, who was at one time close to Gandhiji, disclosed it in Parliament. The biography of Nehru by Dr S. Gopal makes a very brief reference to it though the letter was important as marking a crisis-point in Nehru’s foreign policy.

Earlier still, one would like to have the account of the making of the crisis with China in the 1959-62 period. What really happened when Chou Enlai came to Delhi? Why did Nehru urge him to see his Ministers, instead of he himself discussing the moot points of the border dispute? Important personalities were witnesses to those important events: why have they not written their memoirs?—a very legitimate question for the future generations to raise.

Up and down these fifty years spreading over the onset of independence up till this day, our politics has throughout been marked by transparency, and our leaders of the early days genuinely believed in open diplomacy. And yet our present generation is kept in the dark about the treatment of many of the important issues, both at home and abroad. Coming nearer, one would like to know how much clout India cared to have in Bangladesh once Shekh Mujib was in the saddle. There are good reasons to believe that New Delhi had warned Sheikh Mujib about the danger of an attack on him a few weeks before his assassination, but Mujib in a state of self-delusion had dismissed such a contingency. It is now twenty years since that event took place. Should not somebody who had known the inside story now give it out after two decades?

Similarly there are many grey areas in our relationship with Sri Lanka. The early discus-sions on the Tamil question in the island republic led to the Shastri-Sirimavo pact. There are some memoirs written by those who were involved in it. But there is nothing to tell us in this country how Rajiv Gandhi sent the IPKF to Sri Lanka. This was an important issue for discussion in the Indian Parliament. But was it discussed at all even at the official level? There are publications in Sri Lanka which quote verbatim Indian official papers about the handling of the armed militants, who ironically got their first training in arms under Indian official control and direction, and later on, the very same elements were ranged against our forces. The actors who were directly involved in bringing down our relations with Sri Lanka have so far largely avoided telling us the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Isn’t it time for them to speak out? The disastrous nature of the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka is acknowledged by all hands. Why can’t this question be thrown open for discussion? The more New Delhi concedes the need for introspection, the more easy will it be for a fair amount of objectivity.

Historical events in retrospect do not as a rule apportion blame, but try to get at the objective reality. It is therefore all the more necessary for our civil servants and media specialists to tell the public of this country as also of the world, how a particular development was handled by those who were at the decision-making level, without questioning their authen-ticity. History is a harsh taskmaster. One does not escape its whiplash by fighting shy of looking it in the eye.

(Mainstream, April 22, 1995)