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Mainstream, VOL L, No 19, April 28, 2012

Rational National Security: Mechanism for Defence Preparedness and National Security

Monday 30 April 2012, by S G Vombatkere

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Start Point

It was recently reported that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (PSCD) has summoned the three defence service Chiefs “to seek their views on the state of defence preparedness pointed out by Army Chief General V. K. Singh in his leaked letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh” as they “needed to examine the whole spectrum of defence preparedness”. [Ref. 1] This is a very heartening news, even though the concern was triggered by the leaked contents of General V.K. Singh’s letter. It is heartening because at last there is concern in the legislature regarding India’s defence preparedness.

But it is a moot question whether hearing the three defence service Chiefs individually or together will provide the PSCD a realistic or holistic view of defence preparedness involving all three defence services operating together, as would be necessary for defence against external aggression. In any case, the PSCD is not imme-diately responsible for defence. The defence of the country is the government’s responsibility, and it is the Cabinet that needs to have a holistic view of defence preparedness. The real question is: whether the Cabinet has or can have a holistic idea of defence preparedness.

Apart from actual manning, arming, provi-sioning and training of the three defence services for war, holistic defence preparedness involves:

• assessing threat (intelligence inputs and strategic assessments);

• taking diplomatic initiatives, without prejudice to India’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, to avoid armed conflict or limit its duration if unavoidable; • taking internal security measures so that defence measures can be wholly effective; and

• planning for economic and fiscal measures to handle the huge, high-rate expenditures that are demanded by war.

Specifically, defence preparedness is the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister and the National Security Council (NSC), which need to receive the right advice from the country’s military [hereinafter, “military” means the Army, Navy or Air Force, or the Army, Navy and Air Force] so as to take the right political, foreign policy, internal security and economic decisions to prosecute war or other military operations when required, in the best immediate and long-term interest of the country. But as of now, there is no mechanism in place for the government to receive essential single-point advice from the mili-tary, since summoning the three defence services Chiefs and seeking their views orally or in writing cannot give a holistic idea of defence preparedness. However, even with the best military advice, defence preparedness cannot be complete without a mature strategic vision.

Strategic Vision

PANDIT NEHRU’S strategic outlook of foreign policy neutrality and sturdy political independence in the first two decades after independence, has gradually changed to its current US-predicated strategic dependence, even political subservience. It is regrettable that in the last four plus decades, India has not produced a single political leader with a strategic vision to enable India to adjust to and be on top of today’s rapidly changing geo-econo-political situations in a globalising world. Notwithstanding lack of statesmanship at the apex, reputed Indian strategic think-tanks have recommended creation of a document defining strategic policy encompassing India’s international and regional political, economic (including energy) and military aims and objectives, depending upon its present and future needs. Realistic national security is only possible when strategic policy is explicitly understood by persons in government. But none of the successive Union governments over six decades have pro-duced a strategic document, thus effectively com-promising national security by their ineffecti-veness.

The Defence Spectrum

DEFENCE is a highly specialised area, and a military officer rises to the position of service Chief of the Army, Navy or Air Force with about 40 years of service experience in his own service. He acquires knowledge of the operational capability of the other two services by inter-services exposure in various courses, in joint exercises and also in the hard arena of active operations. He is responsible for and concerned with the operational capability of his own service and looks to the other two services to receive or provide operational support, depending upon the threat situation or type of operation. But in military conflicts-of-the-future, warfare, hitherto limited to operations concerning land, sea, under-the-sea and air, will include the dimensions of space and cyber space warfare. Thus, for the primary role of effective deployment and operations to protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a service chief should be well-versed in the operational and logistic capabilities of his own service and adequately knowledgeable with respect to those of the other two also. It can safely be said that India has never had a service chief who has fallen short in this respect, what-ever his other shortcomings.
In a democratic republic like India in which the military is under the control of an elected government, defence preparedness requires mutual trust between the military and the government. Trust can only come out of direct official, institutionalised, periodic contact and discussions between the government and military. The bureaucracy is a necessary link to assist in their communication, but cannot subs-titute for direct contact.

However, as noted by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, “Our political leadership is highly uncomfortable in dealing with the military directly and prefers to let the bureaucracy do so.” [Ref. 2] Thus the bureaucracy is the de facto functional link between the defence services and the political executives of the union government, and has a stake in maintaining the distance between them.

Notwithstanding that a few select bureau-crats are assigned to study in the Defence Services Staff College, the College of Defence Management and the National Defence College for better understanding and coordination with defence services officers, they cannot be blamed for not knowing the details of the functioning of any of the three services, much less about the issues involved in their integrated functioning in war. At the same time, most politicians are ignorant of the functioning of the defence services and their capabilities, mainly because of their “distance” from the military, whatever the reasons.

Reforms in Higher Defence Management

THE National Security Council (NSC) with the Prime Minister at its head, formed in November 1998 by the BJP-led NDA Union Government, is the apex agency for national security. It was formed to address the need to systematize higher defence management, particularly following India’s dramatic entry into the nuclear club with Pokhran-II six months earlier. The functions of the NSC were earlier being carried out by the Principal Secretary to the PM and, since the formation of the NSC, a senior bureaucrat is the National Security Advisor (NSA). Thus earlier and also currently, the advisor to the Prime Minister on national security is a bureaucrat. The decision-making members of the NSC include the NSA, the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance, and the Deputy Chairman of the Plan-ning Commission. The three defence services Chiefs along with bureaucrats of Secretary rank, are part of the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), which advises the NSC members in decision-making and policy formulation. Thus, when the NSC is meant for higher defence management, excluding a military officer in the decision-making body and having the three defence service Chiefs merely in the SPG, but on the other hand having a bureaucrat as the NSA, is clearly a bureaucratic machination. There can be no objection to having a bureaucrat in the decision-making body; rather, since a bureau-crat is expert in secretarial work and functioning, it is essential to have a bureaucrat as the Member-Secretary of the NSC. But excluding a military officer from defence matters is detrimental to national security. The absence of a national security strategic document even after 62 years of Inde-pendence and 13 years of the NSC’s existence can perhaps be attributed to the absence of a military officer in the national security policy formulation.

Questions of Competence

THE question arises that if a military officer is to be inducted as a member of the NSC, who will that be—the Army Chief or Navy Chief or Air Force Chief, or the seniormost among them? Why not the Chairman of the existing Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)? But this is unsatisfactory to say the least, because the incumbent always has the responsibilities, interests and functionality of his own service at the forefront. Thus the CSC Chairman cannot do justice to rendering single-point advice and assist in decision-making in matters that concern the other two services. The CSC mainly focusses on inter-service coordi-nation issues and cannot have the NSC’s real-time perspective of geo-politics, economics (including energy), foreign affairs, home affairs, finance or development planning that influence national policy. It is a Committee without powers, in its military ivory tower, though its isolation is not of its own making. Also in question is whether the other two service Chiefs will abide by the advice that the CSC Chairman may render, which can lead to decisions impinging on the operational functioning or provisioning of their respective services. Importantly, such advice (even if it is sincere) would be partisan because a service chief’s primary area of experience is in his own service and his primary responsibility is its effective operational functioning. Hence, a service Chief as a member of the NSC is not likely to be an asset to the NSC and worse, could be a spoiler of inter-service synergy. What then would be the solution for inducting a senior military officer into the NSC at the decision-making level?

Reverting to the need to examine “the whole spectrum of defence preparedness”, the previous question morphs to “who is competent to brief or advise on the whole spectrum of defence preparedness?”. Clearly, this has to be a military officer and not a bureaucrat. Also as argued above, any of the three service Chiefs cannot do justice to the job. Hence there has to be a military officer who represents all three services without being burdened with the direct responsibility of running any of them. He must also be senior to all three service Chiefs, serving as the National Security Advisor to the PM just as the PM’s Scientific Advisor does on matters of science and technology. He would necessarily be a member in the NSC and, if he is to be superior to the three service Chiefs, with five-star rank (though he may be of four-star rank if he is the senior most).

This brings the discussion directly to the decades-old demand of the military for appoin-ting a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as a measure of urgent necessity. This has also been supported post-Kargil 1999 by the Kargil Review Committee, headed by strategic affairs analyst K. Subrah-manyam, and the 2001 Group of Ministers (GoM) led by parliamentarian L.K. Advani. The GoM report “Reforming the National Security System” underlined the need to have a CDS because it felt the functioning of the existing CSC comprising the three service heads, “revealed serious weakness in its ability to provide single-point military advice to the government”. Further, in 2009, the PSCD, in its reports tabled in the Lok Sabha, said that India urgently needs a CDS as well as concrete long-term strategic planning, and lame excuses by the government or the Defence Ministry (MoD) in these critical matters will simply not do any longer. [Ref. 3] Notwith-standing these clear recommendations and dire require-ment of a CDS for single-point military advice to the government at the level of the NSC in the interest of national security, there are at least two reasons why the creation of a CDS post has not happened.

Impediments to National Security

AT present, the three service Chiefs are just below the Cabinet Secretary in precedence. Appoint-ment of a CDS of five-star rank would make him above the Cabinet Secretary, and this is unaccep-table to the bureaucracy, which exercises “civilian control over the military” that causes general resentment within the military. The reason for the traditional stand-off between the bureaucracy and military is that while the military unreser-vedly accepts control by the elected executives in government and understands the role of the bureaucracy as the link between itself and the Defence Minister, it resents bureaucratic domi-nance. But this apart, the bureaucrat-NSA has a retired military man as his military advisor! This exposes bureaucratic hubris, the readiness of some senior military officers to acquiesce to blandish-ments, and the regrettable disinterest of the political hierarchy, especially at the highest levels. All these combine to adversely affect national security. Bureaucrats enjoy easy and direct access to the Defence Minister and PM because that access is institutionalised; whereas a service Chief would only get heard based on his professional reputation, or personal relationship or “equation” with the country’s executives, or when he is invited to render advice. Thus the bureaucracy resists creating the appointment of a CDS, since it would effectively challenge the pre-eminence of the IAS and weaken its grip over the military. This is clearly an impediment to national security.

The second reason for no-CDS is internal to the three services and is as serious an impediment to national security as the first. Even though the military recognises the strategic need for a CDS, the three services are locked in an internecine struggle regarding which service should provide the CDS. The tacit (and less than honourable) assumption in this is that he would be partisan to his own service besides allowing one more promotion at the top level. This rivalry is based as much upon personal relations between service Chiefs in-the-chair as upon traditional opinions of which service is pre-eminent among the three from a strategic or operational standpoint and because of fear that the importance of the other two services would be in some manner down-graded. It would be unrealistic not to recognise that this is connected with rivalry for financial and budgetary requirements for military procurement expenditures. Perhaps a scheme of rotational or cyclic appointment would solve this problem, but the inter-service rivalry is not in the best interest of national security, and even goes against the best interest of the defence services. This rivalry is kept simmering by a devious and scheming bureaucracy playing on senior military officers and the defence service Chiefs so that a CDS does not become a reality.

As long ago as 2009, Rajat Pandit [Ref. 4] succinctly wrote: “Reforms have a way of coming in late. No wonder then that a decade after the Kargil conflict exposed deep fissures within the military top brass, some critical lessons, especially on the need for a single-point advice structure, and by extension a General Number 1, are yet to be learnt. It doesn’t help that the Army, Navy and IAF do not see eye-to-eye on this. Compounding matters is the smugness of a bureaucracy happy with the status quo even as it exercises a vice-like grip on the armed forces in the name of ‘civilian control’. The political leadership, in turn, remains apathetic about genuine reforms in the country’s higher defense management.”

Necessity for a CDS

THERE are some issues that demonstrate the necessity and urgency for creating the post of a CDS. The first and most important one is that, as discussed above, the PM and NSC cannot get a full and true picture of the military dimensions of national security from the existing set-up. This is vital in the emerging regional scenario of Chinese military build-up on India’s northern border within easy missile-strike distance of Delhi, and India’s successful launch on April 19, 2012, of a 5500-km range missile that can target Beijing. Noting that there are arguments that nuclear deterrence cannot work at all, a nuclear deterrent can work only when it is backed by adequate conventional military force. The NSC strategising with nuclear second-strike capability (in view of India’s no-first-use policy) without a well-consi-dered military advice is not merely dangerous; it could be disastrous. A CDS answerable to the PM and NSC will be the only competent person to manage India’s nuclear arsenal, which is currently being done by bureaucrats and technocrats who have little or no idea of military strategy and nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) warfare.

Secondly, a CDS will be able to advise the PM and NSC on the military aspects of border issues with neighbouring countries. For example, the advice of a CDS on how to handle Pakistani General Kayani’s very recent suggestion that both Indian and Pakistani troops should withdraw from the icy heights of the Siachen glacier would be invaluable. Few outside the military know that Pakistan’s forces are not on the Siachen glacier at all, but have been kept well to its west by the Indian Army along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), north of point NJ9842. There is need for the NSC to take a call on the history of territorial disputes and conflicts with Pakistan in the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, and particularly in the Ladakh region, by consulting the CDS to get a holistic view of the past situations leading up to the AGPL and possible future scenarios. [Note 1]

It is doubtful whether General Kayani’s suggestion has the sanction of the Pakistani Government. Therefore, without involvement of the Indian Government, a detailed examination of General Kayani’s proposal and assessment of Pakistan’s hidden aims and agendas can be done most effectively by the CDS who would have on-the-ground knowledge of positions, operational and logistical problems, and the pros and cons.

Thirdly, to further strengthen the USA-India strategic ties [Ref. 5], the US Pacific Unified Combatant Command (PACOM) chief, who commands combat forces of the US Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force, interacts separately with India’s three service Chiefs. This does not allow India’s military to get a holistic view of the interactions and plans, thus conceding strategic military advantage to the USA. A CDS who only can have a genuine tri-service perspective will be able to interact to India’s strategic and military advantage.

Finally, as a five-star rank military officer, the CDS will be in a position to advise and mentor the three service Chiefs on the inter-service opera-tional doctrine, encourage tri-service synergy and implement reforms in higher defence manage-ment. This will enable India to play a greater strategic role in international affairs and secure for India the necessary resources for its developmental growth.

Urgent Duty of the Union Government

WITH regard to national security, the discerning observer inevitably comes to the conclusion that India’s national political executives have been without any mature concept of strategic vision, or that they have been too preoccupied with politics of power to bother about national strategy (thus violating the people’s trust), or they do not trust the military. Or else, the machinations of the bureaucracy have ensured that India’s military is not a part of national security policy formulation. To be generous, perhaps it is a little of each, with a large dose of the last. The NSC, functioning with a bureaucrat NSA advising the PM on national security over the past 13 years, has not even brought out a national security strategy document. [Ref. 6] Let alone defining the military’s role in national security, omitting to even consider it systemically compromises national security. And this is well understood by India’s political and military adversaries as well as allies and strategic partners.

The appointment of a CDS as the NSA to the PM and with a position as a full member of the National Security Council (with a senior bureau-crat as the Member-Secretary), and with the three defence service Chiefs remaining in the Strategic Policy Group of the NSC, is a vital necessity if national security is to be addressed rationally. With the Chinese military build-up on our northern border along with the so-called “string of pearls” and other ominous signs, and India’s recent response with Agni-5, the appointment of a CDS is a very urgent strategic responsibility of the government in power.

REFERENCES
 
1. “House panel calls all three service Chiefs”, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/h...> ; Indian Express, New Delhi, April 10, 2012.
2. Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, “Political direction, military leader-ship and morale”, Lecture delivered on the occasion of 112th Birthday Celebrations of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, FICCI Auditorium, New Delhi, January 23, 2010.
3. “India urgently needs chief of defence staff”; <http://articles.timesofindia.indiat...> ; The Times of India, December 17, 2009.
4. Rajat Pandit; “Missing in Action: General No.1”; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...> ; The Times of India; September 26, 2009.
5. Vombatkere, S.G., “Deepening India-US Strategic Ties - Evidences and Repercussions”, Mainstream, New Delhi, Vol XLVIII No 40, September 25, 2010, pp. 13-15.
6. “IDSA Comment”; <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ANa...> ; Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 20, 2011.

NOTES

Note 1. For example, in the military operations between India and Pakistan in 1965 and again in 1971, the Haji Pir pass in POK was captured by Indian troops at tremendous cost of loss of lives and limbs, but after the ceasefire, both times Haji Pir pass was “restored” to Pakistan by India’s political leadership without consulting the military, thereby losing important strategic and tactical advantages. Also, when India’s military forced Pakistani Lt Gen A.A.K.Niazi to sign an instrument of surrender on December 16, 1971 at Dhaka, and took 93,000 Pakistani soldiers prisoner, the prisoners were returned to Pakistan without the political leadership extracting any tactical or strategic advantage, since the military was not consulted. Not consulting the military on national security issues goes against the country’s best security interests.

S.G. Vombatkere retired as a Major General after 35 years in the Indian military, from the post of Additional DG in charge of Discipline and Vigilance in Army HQ. The President of India awarded him the Visishta Seva Medal (VSM) in 1993 for distinguished services rendered. He can be contacted at sg9kere@live.com

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