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Mainstream, Vol XLVIII, No 39, September 18, 2010

Kashmir Crisis

Monday 20 September 2010, by Nikhil Chakravartty

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For long it has been fashionable to talk about the Kashmir crisis as the most intractable challenge before the country and yet do pretty little to deal with it and thereby let the blood-letting go on. Recently, however, one notices some stir in diverse circles both at home and abroad to tackle the Kashmir problem. A feeling appears to have crept in both within the government and in the Opposition that Kashmir can no longer be kept on the back-burner. This sense of urgency has to a large measure been accelerated by Pakistan’s mounting pressure on both the diplomatic and political fronts.

The Prime Minister himself publicly mentioned in his August 15 address from the Red Fort about his “keenness to hold free and fair elections within the framework of the Indian Constitution and to install a popular government” in the trouble-tossed State. The Union Home Minister on his part too has been talking about the possibility of holding elections in Jammu and Kashmir within the next six months. It needs to be noted that the President’s Rule in Kashmir cannot be continued indefinitely: it has to end by September next year.

Of late there has been quite a lot of activity in the Opposition camp too about what’s to be done in Kashmir. Recently the National Conference leader, Dr Farooq Abdullah, and the Janata Dal leader, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, spent sometime in Srinagar and, on their return, a meeting was held at Mufti’s place to discuss the critical situation of the Kashmir Valley which was attended by most of the top leaders who included V.P. Singh and Bommai, Surjeet and Indrajit Gupta and Murasoli Maran from the DMK. Also present was Iftikar Ansari, the Congress leader in the now-defunct Assembly, who is an influential Shia leader of the Valley. The assessment at the meeting was that the militants practically run the show in the Valley while the Army and the para-military forces are only holding on to the terrain but have practically lost the populace. The consensus among these Opposition leaders was that no election would be possible in the Kashmir Valley unless it is preceded by some thaw in the situation, some opening of political activity which, in its turn, could be possible only if the government could indicate about the extent of autonomy it would be prepared to grant to the State. The Opposition leaders are reported to have apprised the Prime Minister about their assessment and have left the matter in his court.

It is generally conceded in the official circles that while the Army and the para-military forces can indefinitely hold on to the Valley, no matter how much it costs in terms of resources and manpower, it is not possible to dislodge the armed militants except by means of the political process.

It needs to be acknowledged that the Kashmir crisis has four facets each of which has a distinct angle, and it is only through the management of these four can there be a viable solution of the Kashmir problem. These are: the situation in the Kashmir Valley itself; the international facet, particularly with relation to the US and the UK; the Pakistan facet and its impact on Indo-Pak relations; and lastly, its bearing on the home front, that is, on Indian politics as a whole.

The actual situation in the Kashmir Valley is that all civic activities are controlled by militants —in some areas by one militant group, in another area by another militant group. The Indian Army guards the frontier along Pakistan, but the terrain is mostly mountainous and it becomes almost impossible to prevent continuous infiltration of militants from the Pakistan side. Inside the Valley, the Indian Police and para-military forces have to clash most of the time with the militants, and the administration is practically at a standstill. There are reports of the local administration having been infiltrated by the militant agents. Many people sympathise with the militants, giving them shelter. Even those in the villages and towns who do not want any armed clashes, do not condemn the militants. Propaganda among the public in the Valley is mostly hostile to the Indian Government.

The clashes between militant groups and Indian forces were a little lower in the period of May and June this year. But they have grown more in August and it was difficult for the Indian authorities to hold any function to mark the Indian Independence Day on August 15. Only a flag hoisting could be managed under tight military security.

The militants in the Kashmir Valley are broadly of three groups:

The Hizbe Islami which is the most fanatic group and is affiliated to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. They want that the Kashmir Valley must be merged into Pakistan. They get direct support in arms and training from Pakistan.

The second group is the Al-Jehad which is also obscurantist. However, they are not openly campaigning for annexation to Pakistan, but take an ambivalent position, though fiercely against Delhi.

The third group is the JKLF (Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front) which wants that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir (including the portion of Kashmir now occupied by Pakistan) must become an independent State, and be attached to neither India nor Pakistan.

Of these three groups, the JKLF is the most popular among the Muslim population in the Kashmir Valley, and the Hizbe Islami is the least popular in the Valley. But the the Hizbe Islami has the largest stock of weapons and the JKLF has the smallest stock of weapons. The Pakistan Government gives weapons and training to all the militant groups so that the Indian Government forces are harassed to the maximum possible extent, but actually the Pakistan Government gives the maximum possible support and weapons to Hizbe Islami, most of whose militant cadres actually come from Pakistan. The Pakistan Government does not fully trust the JKLF leaders, but because the JKLF is popular in Kashmir, it gives them limited quantity of weapons to combat the Indian forces. It is to be noted that in the area of Kashmir now under Pakistan’s occupation, the JKLF faces persecution on many occasions from the Pakistani authorities, because the Pakistan Government, particularly the ISI, does not permit the JKLF to campaign for independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. It is worth noting that, unlike the other two militant formations, the JKLF acknowledges that the Hindu population who had to leave the Valley in large numbers three years ago should be brought back and their houses restored to them.

In the present situation, none of the major parties function in the Valley. All their leaders are out of the Kashmir Valley—either in Jammu or in Delhi. The cadres of these major parties are inactive though they have not left the Valley. They on their own cannot resist the militants. They want their leaders to come and then they may risk holding a mass campaign. At present, it is impossible for any leader to attack or criticise the militants. But it is possible to appeal to the militants that instead of killing people, let there be discussion about the future of Kashmir.

It is in this context that one has to take into account Dr Farooq Abdullah’s recent interview to the BCC in which he clearly distanced himself from New Delhi and said that any discussion on the future of Kashmir has to include besides India and Pakistan, the Kashmiri leaders too. Broadly, this is perhaps meant to evoke a positive response from the JKLF and thereby undermine the base of the fanatical Hizbe Islami.

While this is roughly the situation on the ground, the international facet of the Kashmir crisis can hardly be ignored. The British public, including the Labour Party, at one stage echoed the viewpoint of the militants, laying particular stress on the violation of human rights in the Valley by the Indian armed forces. This was sought to be countered by the official Indian stand which pointed to the violence indulged in by the militants. This approach by New Delhi had a marginal impact on the Western public.

On the part of the US, Washington has clarified that it disapproved of Pakistan’s interference in the affairs of Kashmir. At the same time, it has been pressing for a settlement between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Though no specific proposals for such a settlement has so far officially emanated from Washington, it appears that the ground is sought to be prepared through non-official overtures. It is in this context that the recent thesis by a Carnegic Fellow, James Clad, has attracted a lot of attention. It wants the present line of control to be recognised as the international frontier thereby sanctifying the partition of Kashmir, with some area being ceded by Pakistan on the southern side, while India reciprocating by ceding claim on the north, that is, legitimising the present Sino-Pak deal. One can only say that the James Clad proposal is in the nature of a trial ballon, but it does indicate the likelihood of prodding from the West for a settlement of Kashmir. One more pressure point for New Delhi.

The Pakistan angle was spelt out by its Foreign Secretary during his recent talks with his counterpart in New Delhi when he said Kashmir is “the core issue” of dissonance between the two countries. By the very tenets of the so-called two-nation theory—which forms the ideological platform for the existence of Pakistan—Kashmir with its Muslim majority population contiguously located must belong to the state of Pakistan. This is precisely the reason why the Pakistan authorities are dead set against the JKLF which wants independence for Kashmir; because, any acquiescence to the demand for independence of Kashmir would be a body-blow on the two-nation theory. Further, the right of Kashmiris, as a distinct ethnic group, to independence is a matter of utmost threat for the very integrity of Pakistan. Once the Kashmiri people are allowed to be independent because of a distinct ethnic identity, how could the claims of the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Pakhtoons be denied? And if that is permitted to happen, Pakistan will be reduced to a bloated Punjabi Suba, and nothing more.

Viewed from this angle, BJP leader Dr Murli Manohar Joshi’s suggestion for isolating the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley from Jammu and Ladakh—however rational it may appear—unwittingly helps to strengthen Pakistan’s ideological stand behind its Kashmir policy.

Lastly comes the impact of the Kashmir crisis on the Indian political scene. The Congress, the Janata Dal and the Left feel that there should be more autonomy for Kashmir without which the militants cannot be controlled. There is, however, no clear view yet as to the degree of autonomy to be given. The Congress feels that if too much autonomy is given to Kashmir, the same demand will come from other parts of India.

The BJP is opposed to granting any autonomy to Kashmir. It wants to cancel even Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which gives a very limited degree of autonomy to Kashmir. The BJP’s view in the main is that the Muslim population in Kashmir is unreliable and acts as the agent of Pakistan, and they must not be pampered. It needs to be noted that of all the political parties, the BJP commands preponderant support among the large body of Hindu refugees. From the Valley—numbering nearly three lakhs—who have been living in miserable plight, and whose return has become essential for establishing normalcy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao is, therefore, faced with the dilemma that even if all other parties agree to concede autonomy to Kashmir, the BJP can whip up a campaign against it all over India and say that the Rao Government is surrendering territory to a Muslim population which is anti-Indian. All this may lead to a heightening of communal tension.

It is thus imperative that the building of a national consensus on Kashmir, acceptable to all parties in the country, becomes the crucial responsibility of all concerned, not only of the Prime Minister but all parties including the BJP. The alternative may be disastrous for the nation as a whole, because the present blood-letting can only end up in the disintegration of not only the picturesque Valley but a blow to India’s unity as well. We, all of us, have to bestir ourselves before the grandeur of autumn in the Valley yields to the rigours of a snow-bound winter in three months from now.

(Mainstream, September 5, 1992)

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