South Asia gets a Makeover

Indians would have remembered John Milton’s lines as they stepped into the New Year: “Was I deceived, or did a sable cloud/Turn forth her silver lining on the night?” A hopeful, comforting prospect suddenly appeared from nowhere in the midst of the darkening South Asian security scenario.

Within the space of a week, it appeared—on three templates, unconnected, yet of a kind. The elections to the provincial Assembly in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh and the Sri Lankan Government forces’ capture of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stronghold of Kilinochchi each in its own way will impact on South Asian security.

All three taken together, terrorism, which took giant leaps forward in South Asia last year, has fallen back by a step or two.

The successful conduct of the elections in J&K itself has come as a great relief to New Delhi. The President of the ruling Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, spoke for the national feeling when she said it really did not matter which political party won the elections, but the important thing was that the democratic process gained traction in J&K. Indeed, over 60 per cent of the electorate took part in the election, ignoring the separatists’ call for boycott.

Kashmiris choose the Ballot Box

THE high voter turnout underlines that politics has become competitive—and participatory. The profound significance of this cannot be under-estimated. The camp of diehard secessionists has been marginalised almost as a residual force. There are incipient signs that some among the religious extremist and separatist elements might have probed party politics for the first time in a significant way. In any bitterly fought bloody insurgency, the endgame comes when the irreconcilable elements show signs of willingness to try out the discourse of politics. No doubt, the signs have appeared in the Kashmir Valley.

Another distinguishing feature was that the Kashmir Valley, which is Muslim-majority, handed in a “secular” mandate by electing two regional parties—the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party—which are capable of a broad secular outlook, having been participants in coalition politics at the federal level at one time or another. Clearly, good and responsive gover-nance has become the leitmotif of J&K politics.

On the whole, therefore, the J&K elections augur well for India. In free and fair elections, a representative government is assuming power in the insurgency-ridden State, which enjoys legitimacy. How did this happen?

It is obvious that there is a sense of fatigue among the people of J&K after such bloody violence through almost quarter of a century. Thus, the militants are becoming marginalised. The common people prioritise their day-to-day concerns to be development and the rule of law, and an end to the brutalisation of life at the hands of the militants and the security forces. Finally, there is a groundswell of skepticism among the people—for a variety of factors—in counting on Pakistan to win azadi (freedom) from Indian rule.

Having said that, the Pakistan factor—which is not easily fathomable or spoken about—still remains crucial. Indeed, it may hold the key to what lies ahead. At any rate, Pakistan has incrementally stepped back from fomenting violence in J&K in the past four-year period. The ceasefire on the Line of Control dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan has also held. Equally, despite the cacophony over the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November, no political party or the mainstream media has tried to score propaganda points. The exceptionally high voter turnout in the elections has even been commended. When the dust settles, these new stirrings might get reinforced in India-Pakistan political and diplomatic exchanges. But any substantial shift in dynamics will have to wait until a new government takes over in New Delhi as national elections are due this year.

All this may seem as if history has ended in the Kashmir Valley. Far from it. The faultlines remain very much there. The alienation of the Kashmiri people is palpable. Anyone with a sense of history will only view the prospect of another National Conference-led government with a certain sense of disquiet. But, then, its leader Omar Abdullah, who has assumed office as the Chief Minister, is a new face and promises a clean break from the notoriously corrupt and inefficient governance in the past.

The question is: to what extent will New Delhi remain supportive of Omar? He has voiced creative ideas about reconciliation and a settlement within a broader India-Pakistan context. He had a high-profile visit to Pakistan last year during which the then President, General Pervez Musharraf, went out of the way to warmly receive him and show attention as a key figure in any Kashmir settlement.

However, there are vested interests in both India and Pakistan who may create hiccups. The imponderables in India-Pakistan relations may play into their hands. Which is why the denouement of the present crisis in India’s bilateral relations with Pakistan is of utmost importance. But even an audacious soothsayer will hesitate to predict at this point.

Bangladesh averts ‘Talibanisation’

IN sheer drama, however, the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, which put an end to the two-year Army-backed rule, must take the cake. While the J&K elections did not hold major surprises as such, the results of the Bangladesh elections have come as a political tsunami. Political space in Bangladesh was supposed to have been neatly carved into two halves, which gave the military a handle to manipulate from behind the scenes.

Thus, New Delhi is plainly delighted that the electoral alliance led by the Awami League, which has been traditionally friendly towards India, scored a stunning victory by securing 263 seats in the 299-seat parliament. The mandate is widely regarded as signifying the people’s desire for democratic governance and a clean, corruption-free government.

But there are strong undercurrents that hold enormous significance for South Asian security. The results have shown that the people have given a near-fatal blow to the Islamic political parties. The militant Jamaat-e-Islami, which was considered to be a powerful force in Bangladeshi politics, has been literally trounced, securing only two seats, with its chief, Motiur Rahman Nizami, being defeated. Plainly put, this is an over-whelming mandate against religious fundamen-talism. The people have strongly reacted to the perception of a creeping “Talibanisation” in Bangladesh. This assertion of the secular temper will come as a great relief to New Delhi.

Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina has been a victim of the wrath of the Islamists, being staunchly secular. A wily politician, she will realise that a great opportunity has come her way to exorcise the extremist elements from Bangladesh’s body polity. The best thing to happen, of course, will be if a self-cleansing movement within the Islamist ranks surfaces in the coming period in response to the people’s verdict, and Hasina were to become a rallying point. Hasina no doubt holds a strong hand. Her opponents tried to garner votes with their campaign to “save Islam”, whereas she promised to counter militancy and religious extremism and establish a liberal democratic society. The Bangladeshi electorate, with a voter turnout exceeding 70 per cent, has left no one in doubt what their choice is.

India’s has been a troubled relationship with Bangladesh. It has been at its best during the last stint of the Awami League in power during 1996-2001. The list of pending bilateral issues between the countries is long, involving issues of trade, transit, sharing of waters, disputed border, etc. But from New Delhi’s perspective, the imperatives of security are currently the number one priority. Several separatist groups waging armed insurgency in India’s volatile northeastern region use the Bangladeshi territory as a sanctuary. More important, Indian security agencies allege that Bangladesh has become a staging post for terrorists trained in Pakistan. There is strong suspicion that elements in Bangladesh are often active participants in the terrorist attacks within India.

New Delhi’s main expectation at the present juncture will be that Hasina’s government denies “strategic depth” to the terrorists and insurgent groups. Warmly greeting Hasina on her election victory, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh invited her to pay an early visit to New Delhi. Hasina has called for the creation of a regional task force for combined action against terrorism. Hasina’s promise to extinguish terrorism and militancy has gone down well in New Delhi, but there is also the recognition that this is easier said than done as the roots of the militancy run deep in Bangladesh and a long period of political consolidation lies ahead.

Lankan lurch towards Peace

UNLIKE in J&K and in Bangladesh, it has been nature in its tooth and claw in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, but the end result is nonetheless a boon for South Asian security. The capture of Kilinochchi by the Sri Lankan forces is indeed a turning point in the fortunes of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The organisation has suffered similar reverses in the past and has staged comebacks against seemingly formidable odds, but this time there is a qualitative difference. It most certainly marks the end of the LTTE as a conventional military power, though some may interpret that the organisation has made a tactical retreat from its headquarters of Kilinochi after inflicting heavy damage on the advancing Sri Lankan Army.

The fact is the LTTE has lost its cadre strength; it is unable to access financial resources or indulge in fund-raising activities due to the international ban on it as a terrorist organisation; its stockpiles of arms and ammunition have been vastly depleted. The capture of Kilinochchi enables the military to advance towards the strategic Elephant Pass and to take control of the highway to the northern province of Jaffna. There is undeniably a yearning for peace among the Tamil groups and civilians after the bloody strife lasting quarter of a century.

On the other hand, the government successfully created a rift within the LTTE and took complete control of the Eastern Province. Besides, the Sri Lankan armed forces are today much better equipped and trained than ever before. The high level of coordination between the Sri Lankan Army, Navy and Air Force in the current operations on Kilinochchi have shown the armed forces to be very resolute and highly motivated. To cap it all, Colombo is fully conscious that international opinion is also extremely favourable to the military campaign against the LTTE. There has been hardly any criticism of the massive human rights violations by the Sri Lankan military. Colombo’s excellent media management techniques cannot quite account for the acquiescence of the international community with the rout of the LTTE.

But the decisive factor has always been stance, which Colombo has optimally exploited. Over the years, India has shed its heavily nuanced approach towards the Tamil insurgency. Several factors have come into play. The Sri Lankan Tamil problem is no more the emotive issue that it used to be in the politically sensitive southern State of Tamil Nadu. Mainstream Indian opinion has abhorred the LTTE ever since the assassination by a Tamil of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Government-to-government ties between New Delhi and Colombo have steadily improved. Despite (or because of) the strong undercurrent of suspicion regarding Indian intentions, successive governments in Colombo have assiduously cultivated the Indian elite.

Most important, New Delhi cannot afford to have double standards if a democratically elected government in Colombo chooses to relentlessly wage war against terrorists and separatists. Indian opinion is hardening about trans-border terrorism afflicting the region. Therefore, New Delhi took a clear stand that while paying attention to the welfare of Tamil civilians, it would in no way interfere with the Sri Lankan Government’s offensive on the LTTE. At the same time, India trained and equipped the Sri Lankan armed forces and ensured that the LTTE was denied safe havens in the southern State of Tamil Nadu. The Indian Navy cooperated with its Sri Lankan counterpart in cutting off the LTTE’s supply lines.

What lies ahead? There should be no doubt that the LTTE remains far from vanquished as a terrorist organisation, though the fall of Kilinochchi is a huge blow to the organisation politically. If a parallel is to be drawn with the Irish Republican Army, the LTTE can go on and on for many more years. All that the Sri Lankan Government can legitimately aspire to at this juncture is to incrementally reduce the LTTE to a residual force. Its key objective will be to capture or eliminate the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Within hours of the fall of Kilinochchi, a LTTE suicide bomber struck in the heart of Colombo at the headquarters of the Sri Lankan Air Force. All indications are that the LTTE’s armed formations have moved into the jungles of Mullaitivu district neighbouring Kilinochchi, and may take recourse to guerilla tactics.

The million-dollar question is whether New Delhi can expect Colombo to reciprocate its helpful stance on the war by heeding its advice to rewrite Sri Lanka’s Constitution as a federal structure that guarantees equal rights to the Tamil community and opens the way to a durable settlement of the Tamil problem, which casts its shadows on the southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu and impacts on India’s national security, apart from vitiating the regional security climate. Clearly, without popular support, the LTTE cannot survive. Hence the importance of a credible political package that wins over the Tamil community and isolates the LTTE.

Unfortunately, there are no signs of that happening any time soon. To put it mildly, the Sri Lankan Government is in no tearing hurry. It is instead busy mobilising Sinhalese chauvinism. Notwithstanding Colombo’s propaganda of a “war for peace programme” in the Eastern Province, which slipped out of LTTE control from 2004, the ground reality is that violence continues and the government is not able to deliver what it promised. Nothing much has happened by way of rebuilding the Eastern Province. In sum, a credible political package is missing.

What seems likely is that President Mahinda Rajapakse will cash in on the current wave of Sinhalese nationalism and call for early parliamentary elections to obtain an increased mandate for his political party. Meanwhile, the Tamil issue might be put on the backburner. Rajapakse is a shrewd politician and he will probably count on the easing of pressure from New Delhi on this score as India too is heading for parliamentary elections in May. Rajapakse will estimate that he has respite from Indian pressure for another six months until a new government is formed in New Delhi. He will make sure to touch base with New Delhi, but essentially wait and take stock of the emergent equations between the two capitals before moving on a Tamil political package.

Sri Lankans, both at the level of the elite and at mass level, resent India’s perceived interference in their country’s internal affairs. Therefore, a section of the Indian strategic community has voiced criticism that New Delhi has “lost the game” to Colombo and that a diminution of Indian influence on Sri Lanka has become all but inevitable. Their insinuation is that New Delhi should have kept a “back channel” open to the LTTE and to use the Tamil problem as a geopolitical trump card. Their main grouse is that adversarial powers like China and Pakistan have been stepping up their presence in Sri Lanka and unless New Delhi keeps Colombo on a tight leash, the island will diversify its patrons. It is actually a kind of Monroe Doctrine that New Delhi used to practice in the 1980s and 1990s.

However, on balance, New Delhi has followed a wise policy that gave weight to South Asia’s security and stability. Curiously, the current Indian stance bears a vague resemblance to China’s strategy of “peaceful development” as the core of its foreign policy in the neighbouring regions. Indeed, the Indian strategic community has quite some way to catch up with the seamless sophisticated Chinese idea that in the present-day era of globalisation, the concept of national interest has become a “hybrid with certain ‘international community-esque’ traits”—to quote Professor Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in a recent article in the government-owned China Daily newspaper.

As Shi put it, “The strategic benefit of peaceful development is apparent. It is overwhelmingly dependent on peaceful and non-military sources of power and projection of influence. It is by nature non-violent and non-invasive, all-win and mutually beneficial, and, relatively speaking, least likely to evoke strong resistance while its result is most acceptable. That makes it effective and worthwhile at the same time.”

Sri Lanka indeed promises to become an interesting test case of a Chinese-model nascent Indian regional strategy in South Asia. Detractors in the Indian strategic community may have a point that power politics cannot be wished away as it remains a basic characteristic in regional politics, especially in geopolitical contexts such as highly strategic Sri Lanka, which has profound implications for India’s territorial security. But New Delhi’s priority in Sri Lanka has been steadily shifting from military-security to economic development and soft power and interdependence between the two national economies.

Rajapakse can draw comfort that it is only a remote, almost non-existent possibility that a new government in New Delhi six months hence will significantly depart from the current approach. The heart of the matter is that Indian sights are definitely focused on terrorism and regional stability as never before. It simply can’t be otherwise. The festering wound in Afghanistan is almost becoming a gangrene affecting regional security and stability and New Delhi will be loathe to see that in another tip of the Indian subcontinent another wound lies open.

(Courtesy: Asia Times)

Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.